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INTEGRATION OF SECURITIES OFFERINGS:
OBSTACLES TO CAPITAL FORMATION REMAIN FOR
SMALL BUSINESSES
PERRY E. WALLACE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal securities laws and regulations have always contained special
provisions to promote capital formation by small businesses.' Many of these
special provisions emphasize the elimination of unnecessary regulatory bur-
dens on the sale of securities. 2 These regulatory relief initiatives derive from
two well-founded beliefs: (1) when regulation is burdensome and inefficient,
small issuers of securities suffer inordinately, and thus unfairly, compared
with larger companies;3 and (2) these small issuers confer significant eco-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B. Engr., 1970,
Vanderbilt University; J.D., 1975, Columbia University. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey
D. Saper and Russell B. Stevenson, Jr. for their comments on a draft of this Article. Thanks
are also due to Mark A. Sargent for his sharing of ideas and insights and for his support.
1. The terms "small business," "small business issuer," and "small issuer," as used
in this Article, are intended to be synonymous. They refer generally to businesses having
relatively small assets and earnings, and sustaining no active market for their securities on a
national exchange or over the counter. See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers (And Others)
Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127, 127
(1985-86). Quantitative measures for identifying a small business are set forth in both the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) (the 1933 Act) (total assets on the last
day of its most recent fiscal year of $3,000,000 and engaged or proposing to engage in small
business financing), and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982) (the
1934 Act) (which does not use the term "small business," but provides an exemption from its
registration requirements for public companies with less than $5,000,000-pursuant to regu-
latory provision-in total assets as of the last day of its most recent fiscal year). See Riccio,
Cheney, Sibears & Garry, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Small Business: An
Overview of an Administrative Response to the Capital Needs of Small Business, 18 NEw
ENG. L. Rnv. 841, 842-43 (1983) [hereinafter Riccio]; see also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SEcunms RE ULATioN 337-38 (Ist ed. 1983) ('Small Business' is the darling of Congress
and the essence of the American dream .... [O]ver the years both Congress and the SEC
have addressed the problem of financing small business in various (not always consistent)
ways.")
2. The statutory foundation of these provisions consists of certain exemptions from the
expensive and time-consuming registration requirements of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c and 77d, contain the actual statutory
exemptions most directly related to the capital formation process. They were not designed
solely for small businesses, but the needs and problems of small businesses were prominent
considerations in the adoption of these sections. See L. Loss, supra note 1, at 337-40; infra
note 5.
3. See 1986 SEC Gov'T-Bus. F.'SmALL Bus. CAPrrAL FomamAaON, FiNAL REP. 22 (Jan.
1987) [hereinafter 1986 Gov'T-Bus. REP.] ("[T]he prohibitive effect of ... [securities law
compliance] costs is especially evident with the smaller businesses that can't bear the high
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nomic benefits upon American society, making them particularly deserving
of relief from unnecessary legal strictures.
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In creating and administering these initiatives, however, Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), and the
courts have sought to preserve the statutory policy of promoting investor
protection through full and fair disclosure; those bodies have attempted to
balance this policy meaningfully with the goal of encouraging capital for-
mation through the pragmatic application of the securities laws.5 The result
of this balancing act is the array of regulatory benefits, burdens, and
conflicts visited upon small issuers of securities.
Governmental action aimed at producing an efficient and balanced
securities regulatory system for small business capital formation generally
has been well received.6 Moreover, federal lawmakers and administrators
continually have improved this system. 7 But in spite of the extensive im-
costs."); Riccio, supra note 1, at 843 ("[Tlhe problems of small businesses competing with
larger companies for available capital are compounded by governmental regulation, which
results in costs that fall proportionally more heavily on small companies."); Securities Act
Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 8, 1982) (in which Securities and Exchange
Commission adopted regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1987): "[T]he registration
requirements and the exemptive scheme of the Securities Act impose disproportionate restraints
on small issuers.").
4. 1986 WmTE HousE CONF. oN SmALL Bus., FnAL REp., at iii (Nov. 1986) (letter of
transmittal to the President of the United States, submitting 60 recommendations for an
improved governmental regulatory environment for small businesses and noting that: "[d]ynamic
and innovative small businesses are the Nation's major job creators. Together they generate
almost 40 percent of the GNP.").
5. The theme of balancing capital formation measures against investor protection is a
constant one in securities law. One example is regulation D (17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506), which
"is the product of the Commission's evaluation of the impact of its rules and regulations on
the ability of small businesses to raise capital." Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, supra note
3, at 11,251 (footnote omitted). After discovering that owners of small businesses and others
believed that "the registration requirements and the exemptive scheme of the Securities Act
impose disproportionate restraints on small issuers," the SEC promulgated regulation D "in
order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors." Id. (emphasis
added).
See also Gadsby, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financing of Small
Business, 14 Bus. LAw. 144, 145 (1958), in which the author, then the Chairman of the SEC,
describes the importance, as well as the interplay, of investor protection and capital formation:
In the administration of the powers and responsibilities vested in it by the securities
acts, the Commission is guided by two more or less overlapping standards, that of
the public interest and that of the protection of investors. I say two standards, since
the term "public interest" includes more than concern for a protection of investors
as such. It requires the Commission to look beyond these immediate interests and
to take into consideration the welfare of the economy as a whole. Thus, while it
[the "public interest"] is looking to the protection of prospective investors in dealing
with small business, or big business for that matter, it must be careful not to erect
such burdensome requirements as to discourage the raising of the capital necessary
to the growth of business and industry. (Emphasis added.)
6. See Gadsby, supra note 5.
7. For a discussion of the initiatives of the SEC and Congress over the years, from
adoption of the 1933 Act up to the present, see Riccio, supra note 1. See also L. Loss, supra
note 1, at 337-340.
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provements, nagging problems remain. Many existing legal requirements
and limitations inject undue restrictiveness and uncertainty into the capital
formation regulatory structure, which means that small issuers attempting
to distribute securities still must proceed in fear of substantial adverse legal
and economic consequences.' And of the various sources of angst facing
the small issuer, none has proved more frustrating and elusive than the
doctrine of integration of securities offerings.
A. The Integration Doctrine: Objectives and Rationale
The integration doctrine requires that under some circumstances, the
SEC may deem purportedly separate groupings of securities distributions by
an issuer to be one single group. This single group-rather than the
purportedly separate ones-must meet the requirements of any registration
exemptions claimed, or in the alternative, must be registered under the
Securities Act of 1933. 9 The integration doctrine contemplates that an issuer
may try to divide what is, in reality, a single issue or offering'° of securities
into two or more smaller transactions, seeking to have each transaction
classified as a discrete issue or offering. These smaller transactions ostensibly
are structured so that they satisfy the requisites of sections 311 or 412 of the
1933 Act, and, therefore, are exempt from the registration requirement. The
issuer's goal in attempting to divide a single issue into several smaller
transactions (and thus hopefully qualify for an exemption from the regis-
tration requirement) is to avoid the substantially higher costs and other
burdens associated with the registration process.' 3 Under the integration
8. In addition to the integration doctrine, which is the topic of this Article, the
commentators also have identified other troublesome areas, such as the disclosure requirements
and the prohibition against general advertising of regulation D; the resale restrictions of rule
144; and the scope of the definition of "accredited investor" in regulation D. See Campbell,
supra note 1; Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Dead Wood Out of its Disclosure System?,
38 Bus. LAW. 833 (1983). Violation of these often vague or unnecessary strictures gives rise
to substantial legal liability and ensuing economic hardship. See infra note 17.
9. See generally, Note, Securities Regulation: Integration of Securities Offerings, 34
OKLA. L. REv. 864 (1981); Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under the Securities Act: Once an
Exemption, Not Always ... , 31 MD. L. RPv. 3 (1971). See also Deaktor, Integration of
Securities Offerings, 31 U. FiA. L. Rnv. 465, 492 (1979):
Integration is the logical extension of the notion that an issuer should not be allowed
to circumvent an exemption's requirements by resorting to a combination of trans-
actional exemptions to insulate what would otherwise be a nonexempt public offering
from the 1933 Act's registration provisions.
10. The 1933 Act does not define the terms "issue" or "offering," but their meaning
and interpretation clearly are central to any attempt to thwart circumvention of the registration
requirement through the artificial division of what is actually a single financing transaction
(i.e., an "issue" or "offering"). See Stevenson, Integration and Private Placements, 19 Rnv.
SEC. & CoM. REG. 49 (1986); Deaktor, supra note 9, at 492. Since these terms are used
interchangeably throughout the literature, they will be so used throughout this Article.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982).
13. See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the high costs and
other extreme burdens of registration.
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doctrine, however, if two or more otherwise exempt offering transactions
by an issuer are found to violate the doctrine's principles of investor
protection, the separate offerings will be combined, or "integrated," re-
sulting in a single offering.' 4 Depending on the extent of such integration
and the absolute number and degree of sophistication of the integrated
purchase group, the resultant offering may not qualify for any single
exemption under sections 3 or 4, and therefore the issuer will be in violation
of the section 5 registration requirement.
5
The integration doctrine developed as a response to abuses in the
registration process that were thought to threaten investor protection. In-
deed, the exemptions from the burdens of registration promised by the 1933
Act, combined with the Act's broad and often imprecise language (for
example, the failure of the Act to define "issue" and "offering"16) create
a major incentive for the use of artificially separated securities transactions.
7
Yet the 1933 Act did not expressly define, or even strongly suggest, the
integration doctrine."8 Given the obvious potential for serious abuse ema-
nating from the words of the Act itself, the development of some admin-
istrative construct was required to preserve the vitality of the Act's goal of
protecting investors by requiring full and fair disclosure. Through regulatory
initiatives and interpretations by the Securities Exchange Commission, 9 and
through interpretive and no-action letters by the SEC staff,20 the SEC, with
some assistance from the courts, 2' formulated the integration doctrine.
14. See Kripke, supra note 8, at 839.
15. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 57-58; T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcuTrrrs REGU-
LATION 182 (1985); START-up ComPANEs § 4.01, at 4-4 (R. Harroch ed. 1985) ("Failure to
comply with the registration requirements of the federal securities laws could lead to a variety
of severe consequences, including but not limited to rescission of the purchase ... [15 U.S.C.
§ 771], damages [15 U.S.C. § 771], criminal prosecution [15 U.S.C. § 77x], and injunctive
actions [15 U.S.C. § 77t]").
16. See supra note 10.
17. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 49.
18. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 49, 51.
19. The SEC has both general and specific rulemaking authority to promulgate rules in
the nature of (1) substantive or legislative rules; (2) interpretative or definitional rules; and (3)
internal or housekeeping rules. See Riccio, supra note 1, at 844-848; L. Loss, supra note 1,
at 148-49, 375.
20. Both types of letters are generally referred to as "no action" letters. They are not
formal pronouncements of the SEC, and- therefore, do not carry with them the force of law.
These letters, and the written requests that initiate them, have been made available to the
public since February, 1971, and merely provide guidance and advice from the SEC staff on
whether any enforcement action will be taken based on a specific factual pattern. The policy
of making no-action letter requests and responses available to the public, however, has probably
increased their importance and impact. See Deaktor, supra note 9, at 525-26; Morrissey,
Integration of Securities Offerings - The ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal, 17 SEc. L. REv. 147,
165 (1986); Adoption of Section 200.81 and Amendment of Section 200.80, Securities Act
Release No. 5098 [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,921 (Oct. 29, 1970).
21. There have been relatively few cases on integration, overall. The early cases often
declined to integrate offerings, but later ones showed a trend toward integration, often relying
on SEC regulations. See Morrissey, supra note 20, at 167-175.
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Notwithstanding the salutary goal of the integration doctrine to protect
investors, fairness requires that liability under the doctrine should ensue
only if: (1) a clear and rational standard is used to judge when an issuer's
offerings will be integrated.into a single offering; and (2) the use of two
or more artificially separated-but otherwise exempt-offerings, rather than
a single, registered offering truly falls to provide the nature and degree of
investor protection contemplated in the 1933 Act. As to the first point,
workable standards are necessary to enable good faith issuers and their
counsel to develop financing plans and implement them with a reasonable
degree of certainty and utility. Workable standards also allow regulators to
state the law accurately and intelligibly in their pronouncements on the
doctrine.? As to the second point, the question whether artificially separated
offerings actually threaten investor protection goes to the heart of the
doctrine's raison d'etre.23 Because any formulation designed to improve the
integration doctrine must address these two points, both have been the
focus of considerable comment.
B. Current Formulations for Applying the Integration Doctrine
The SEC currently determines whether an offering will be integrated
into one or more offerings based upon factors enumerated in SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4434, which reaffirms the applicability of integration to
intrastate offerings that are exempt under section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act,
and Release No. 4552, which reaffirms the applicability of integration to
private placements under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. 24 The releases provide
that purportedly separate offerings may be integrated depending on the
presence of the following factors:
(1) the offerings are part of a single plan of financing;
22. Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus.
LAW. 595 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Report]. In this report by a task force of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, considerable concern is
expressed about the great "lack of certainty" facing any issuer attempting to determine whether
two planned offerings will be integrated. The reason for this uncertainty is the failure of the
securities laws to provide a clear and manageable analytical scheme for resolving integration
questions. Given the potential for substantial liability attending a violation of the registration
requirement, such uncertainty could undermine the capital formation process. Id. at 600; see
also Deaktor, supra note 9, at 473-74.
23. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 596. Perhaps the most strident critic of the
integration doctrine is Professor Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., who advocates the elimination
of the doctrine itself:
[The integration concept should be eradicated. The concept makes no sense. It has
no defensible policy basis, limits the availability of legitimate exemptions from
registration and, as a result, unnecessarily restricts the availability of capital for
small (and large) issuers.
Campbell, supra note 1, at 163.
24. Exemption for Local Offerings From Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434,
1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270 (Dec. 6, 1961); Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities
Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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(2) the offerings involve the issuance of the same class of security;
(3) the offerings are made at or about the same time;
(4) the same type of consideration is to be received;
(5) the offerings are made for the same general purpose.
25
In addition to the five factors derived from the releases, the SEC has
incorporated a "safe harbor" concept into the calculus of solutions to
integration problems. Rule 502(a) of regulation D 26 and rule 147 27 both
create a conclusive presumption that two or more exempt offerings will not
constitute a single offering when they are separated by six-month intervals.
Additionally, rule 152 provides that a private offering made under section
4(2) of the 1933 Act will not be integrated with a subsequent public
offering.
28
Although these SEC formulations were introduced to create greater
objectivity and utility with respect to the integration doctrine, they often
have had precisely the opposite effect. The five-factor test of Release Nos.
4434 and 4552 has been criticized severely as being confusing and unhelpful.
Some of the factors are subjective and some overlap, for example. Perhaps
the most unfortunate shortcomings of the test are that the SEC has not
provided guidance as to the meaning of important terms used in these
factors, has not provided information about the interrelationship of the
factors (such as the relative weight and importance of each to the other),
and has not suggested the number of factors that must be present to trigger
operation of the integration doctrine. Additionally, the SEC staff and the
courts have rendered interpretations of the integration doctrine that appear
to invoke factors other than those of Release Nos. 4434 and 4552.29
In addition to the confusion surrounding the five-factor test, the six-
month safe harbor rules potentially are disadvantageous to issuers because
25. Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434,
1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2272 (Dec. 6, 1961); Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities
Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2781 (Nov. 6, 1962). Although the factors
stated in the two releases are the same, the language introducing the factors is different in the
two releases. Release No. 33-4434 states that "[a]ny one or more of the following factors may
be determinative of the question of integration . . ." while Release No. 33-4552 states that
"[tihe following factors are relevant to such question of integration .. " Exemption for
Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
2272 (Dec. 6, 1961); Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2781 (Nov. 6, 1962). It is not clear whether the SEC intended
that different treatment be given to integration questions arising under the different exemptions.
See Morrissey, supra note 20, at 162-63; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECuRrrIES REGULATION
343 (5th Ed. 1982); Deaktor, supra note 9, at 503.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1988). See also Revisions of Certain Exemptions From
Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No.
6389, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (1988).
28. 17 C.F.R. §230.152 (1988). See also Securities Act Release No. 33-305 (Mar. 2, 1935)
(available from SEC).
29. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 595, 596, 600, 623; Deaktor, supra note 9, at 502,
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they restrict the issuers' flexibility in timing capital-raising efforts. Partic-
ularly with start-up companies, such flexibility is critical to successful capital
formation.3 0 The safe harbor rules also allow the SEC to avoid clarification
of the regulatory language and refinement of the principles underlying
integration. Additionally, these safe harbor protections are limited to offer-
ings that fit into the exemptions from registration available under either
rule 147 or regulation D.31
The protections offered by rule 152 also are limited. Rule 152, by its
express terms, applies only to issuances in which private offerings under
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act are attempted or effected prior to a public
offering. Furthermore, rule 152, if interpreted literally, would not apply to
public offerings made after a section 4(2) private offering unless the actual
decision to carry out the public offering was made "subsequent" to the
private offering; such an interpretation could serve as a direct disincentive
to engage in sound, long-term financial planning.
3 2
Finally, quite apart from the foregoing criticisms, a threshold question
remains: Whether the requirements of each exemption provide such a high
degree of investor protection so as to accomplish the goals of the Act and
to nullify the need for the integration doctrine. This question is especially
, compelling in light of improvements in some exemptions. 3
Because of the inadequacies in the present approaches to the integration
doctrine, capital formation has suffered. 4 For small businesses in particular,
the spectre of regulatory reproach and private litigation can easily dash
capital formation plans. 35 Given these problems, various recommendations
for change in the regulatory approach to the doctrine have been made in
30. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the shortcomings
inherent in a six-month integration safe harbor.
31. See Deaktor, supra note 9, at 516-519.
32. See Sachs & Cowan, Integration of Securities Offerings-A Trilogy of Recent SEC
Pronouncements, The Daily Rec., Baltimore, June 10, 1986, at 5 (discussing the no-action
letter in Verticom Inc. in which the SEC staff stated it would take no enforcement action
with respect to a section 4(2) private placement and a planned registered offering notwithstand-
ing the fact that the decision to make the registered offering was made prior to issuing
securities using the private placement exemption); Real Estate Syndicators Ask Staff to Consider
Reg. D Changes, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 590-91 (April 25, 1986).
33. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 596 ("Moreover, the integration concept currently is
being invoked in many diverse circumstances involving the five transaction exemptions under
the Act (and several rules thereunder) that would otherwise be available-many of which have
their own means for ensuring investor protection-to which the necessity for an integration
concept may vary greatly."); Campbell, supra note 1, at 167-69.
34. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 596 ("If consistently and strictly applied, the concept
could cause numerous sales to be integrated (and thereby registered) when their registration
would not significantly enhance investor protection and could seriously impair the issuer's
capital formation and operating plans."); Deaktor, supra note 9, at 541 ("uncertainties and
delays in implementing financial planning can be ruinous").
35. Campbell, supra note 1, at 163 ("[T]he tangles and snares of the doctrine generally
are less troublesome to larger issuers ... Small issuers . . . may not have [the same] ...
financing flexibility, so the loss of a single financing alternative through the impact of
integration might be significantly more harmful.").
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recent years. The most notable and comprehensive proposals come from
two task forces of the American Bar Association (ABA).3 6
This Article will examine the more prominent approaches to improve-
ment of the integration doctrine, focusing primarily on the latest and most
comprehensive ABA proposals ("ABA Report").3 After briefly discussing
the basic regulatory scheme within which the integration problem occurs,
the Article will explain the history and development of the doctrine, and
proceed with an overall analysis of the proposals set forth in the ABA
Report, simultaneously making recommendations. The major premise of
this Article is that the comprehensive ABA task force proposals would be
a substantial improvement over the present uncertain and inhibitory atmos-
phere created by the integratioh doctrine. The proposals should be modified
and supplemented in several areas, however, because their present structure
promises only limited utility to small and growing businesses. It is submitted
that the ABA proposals, with the modifications and additions recommended
herein, would greatly improve the capital formation environment for small
businesses, while preserving investor protection as contemplated in the
Securities Act of 1933.
II. REGISTRATION
The Securities Act of 1933 governs the distribution of securities under
federal law.3 8 Section 5 of that Act,3 9 the key provision regarding disclosure
in the distribution process, provides that no offer to sell or offer to buy a
security may be made, in interstate commerce or through the mails, until a
registration statement relating to that security is filed with the SEC;40 that
no sale or delivery after sale, in interstate commerce or through the mails,
of such a security may take place until this registration statement has
become effective; 4' and that no sale or delivery of the security, in interstate
commerce or through the mails, may occur unless a legally sufficient
prospectus relating to that security, which meets the requirements of section
36. One of the two reports focuses on integration of partnership offerings. ABA
Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and Unincorporated Associations, Integration of Part-
nership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1982)
(hereinafter ABA Partnership Report). The latest report addresses the integration doctrine
generally. Rather than review or revise the ABA Partnership Report, the ABA decided, in its
more comprehensive report, to "incorporate and integrate its very useful proposals into a
more comprehensive integration analysis." ABA Report, supra note 22, at 597.
37. The Article will also draw upon observations and recommendations from studies of
the doctrine other than those of the ABA.
38. See generally L. Loss, supra note 1, at 92; R. JENNINoS & H. MARSH, supra note
25, at 40-41.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982). Nor may any such offers be made while the registration
statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or any pre-effective-date public inquiry
under section 8 of the Act.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982).
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10 of the Act, 42 has been provided to the purchaser. 43 The Act imposes
these requirements in order "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails" 44 in the interest of investor protection.
Compliance with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act allows
a company to sell its securities to the public, and "going public" carries
with it certain advantages. 45 Capital infusion is generally the leading benefit
of going public. The creation of a public trading market is another sub-
stantial advantage, carrying with it a significant increase in liquidity, im-
mediate and future financial flexibility, credibility, and potential for providing
employee incentives. 4 On the other hand, going public brings with it certain
disadvantages that, particularly in the start-up- phase, tend to discourage
most small businesses from going public.
For a small business the most prohibitive aspects of becoming a public
company are the time, expense, and increased potential liability that accom-
pany the registration process. 47 Civil and criminal liability for improper
registration under sections 11, 12 and 17 of the 1933 Act is of particular
concern because not only the company, but also the officers, directors, and
others participating in the registration process are potentially liable. 4 The
founders' or the managers' control and management flexibility frequently
are affected adversely by going public.4 9 Additionally, compliance with the
periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
entails potential liability, expense, loss of privacy as to material transactions,
threats to competitive position, and generally greater accountability to
investors and the capital markets. 50 Finally, if a securities issuance encounters
an unreceptive market in an initial public offering or in the aftermarket,
the result will be diminished investor confidence.51 These disadvantages,
inherent in the registration process, frequently discourage small businesses
42. 15 u.S.C. § 77j (1982).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1982).
44. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a (1982)); see also Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 641 (9th Cir.
1980).
45. See generally Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and
Consequences, 27 VrL. L. Rav. 1 (1981)[hereinafter Schneider]; Sonsini, Going Public for the
First Time, 9 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERILUS J., No. 6, at 45 (1985); T. HAZEmN, supra
note 15, at 24-26.
46. See Schneider, supra note 45, at 3-4; Sonsini, supra note 45, at 45-46; T. HAZEN,
supra note 15, at 24-25.
47. See Schnieder, supra ncte 45, at 4-6; Sonsini, supra note 45, at 46; T. HAZEN, supra
note 15, at 25-26; Jacobs, Taking It to the Street, Wall St. J., May 19, 1986, at 31D, col. 1.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, e, q. (1982); see T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 180-205.
49. See Schneider, supra note 45, at 4-6; Sonsini, supra note 45, at 46; T. HAZEN, supra
note 15, at 25-26; Jacobs, supra note 47.
50. See Schneider, supra note 45, at 4-6; Sonsini, supra note 45, at 46; T. HAZEN, supra
note 15, at 25-26; Jacobs, supra note 47. See generally Schneider & Shargel, "Now That You
Are Publicly Owned... ", 36 Bus. LAW. 1631 (1981).
51. See generally Schneider & Shargel, supra note 50.
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from becoming public companies. If a company's management decides that
the disadvantages of registration are too great, the company may still choose
to raise capital through the distribution of securities; instead of registration,
however, the company may elect to proceed under the registration exemp-
tions of sections 3 and 4.
III. EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION
Because the section 5 registration process can be exceedingly costly and
time consuming, and because certain securities and securities transactions
are of such a character that they do not require extensive formal disclosure
in order to protect investors, Congress enacted the exemptions in sections
3 and 4 of the 1933 Act.5 2 Additionally, pursuant to these sections, the SEC
has promulgated a series of rules and regulations to facilitate interpretation
of the sections' various provisions. Included among these rules and regu-
lations are several "safe harbor" provisions, designed to provide greater
certainty for issuers in their attempts to comply with the statutory exemp-
tions.
5 3
The rationale behind certain of the exemptions from registration seems
to apply particularly well to small businesses. These businesses require
relatively modest capital infusions through the sale of securities, yet the
businesses generally cannot afford to conduct a public registration. 54 Often,
the prospective investors are a few insiders or others who have sufficient
knowledge about the particular business to make an informed investment
decision.5 As a matter of public policy, those who invest with such knowl-
edge are not viewed as requiring extensive formal disclosures. In other
words, registration of some issues is unnecessary for investor protection
because the size of the offering is relatively small, or because of the nature
of the relationship between the issuer and the purchasers.
56
A. Section 3(a)(9)
Section 3(a)(9) of the Act exempts exchanges of securities from the
registration requirement when they are "exclusively" between an issuer and
52. See START-Up ComPANjEs, supra note 15, at 4-2 - 4-5; 1986 Gov'T-Bus. REPORT,
supra note 3, at 22.
53. Pertinent to small businesses are rule 147, regulation A and the three exemptive rules
under regulation D. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147, § 230.251 - .262, § 250.504 - .506 (1988).
54. Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, as well as rules 504 and 505 promulgated thereunder,
for example, set dollar-value limits on the amount of capital that can be raised under the
exemption as part of the compensating scheme for obviating the registration requirement. See
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 - .505 (1988).
55. Various exemptions, such as rule 506 of regulation D, limit the number of investors,
require certain indicia of financial acumen or ability, or both. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988).
56. This is the essential reasoning behind the exemptions of sections 3 and 4, particularly
those generally used by small businesses. See M. STEIaNERo, SEcuIunas REGULATON 97-98
(1986) (Professor Steinberg presents three problems involving typical factual contexts for small
businesses that must raise capital through the use of exemptions).
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existing security holders, provided no commission or other remuneration is
paid, directly or indirectly, for soliciting the exchange. 7 The exemption is
narrowly limited to the securities of a single issuer, and the exemption is
subject to a good faith requirement that precludes availability where the
issuance is designed to circumvent the registration requirements.
58
Section 3(a)(9) has its greatest applicability in the context of recapital-
izations. Securities issued in such circumstances are exempted from the
section 5 requirements since only existing security holders may be offerees;




Section 3(a)(10) provides an exemption from registration for issuances
of securities in exchange for securities, claims, or property interests where
the "fairness" of that issuance has been approved by a competent court or
administrative body after a formal hearing. 60 This exemption is often used
in acquisitions requiring a formal merit review hearing on the fairness of
the exchange. 61 This type of review, based on the merits of the transaction,
is considered by some to provide not only adequate investor protection, but
even superior protection to that provided by the registration process. 62
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1982). The securities covered in Section 3, including those of
section 3(a)(9), are technically called "exempted securities," which means that the securities-
themselves are exempt from registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1982). In contrast, the
exemptions covered by section 4 are "transactional exemptions," since they apply to specific
types of securities transactions and not to the securities themselves. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d
(1982); T. HAZEM, supra note 15, at 85-86; Morrissey, supra note 20, at 154. But, as Professor
Loss has observed, "the dichotomy between the 'exempted securities' and the 'exempted
transactions' was not carefully considered." L. Loss, supra note 1, at 297. Indeed, the section
3 exemptions discussed in this Article are all, in essence, transactional ones, since they begin
and expire with the creation and termination of the qualifying transaction. See L. Loss, supra
note 1, at 297-98; T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 85-86.
58. L. Loss, supra note 1, at 301-308; T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 96-98; Hicks,
Recapitalizations Under Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933, 61 VA. L. REv. 1057
(1975).
59. See supra note 58.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1982).
61. See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 98-99; Ash, Reorganizations and Other
Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1980);
Glanzer, Schiffman & Packman, Settlement of Securities Litigation Through the Issuance of
Securities Without Registration: The Use of Section 3(a)(10) in SEC Enforcement Proceedings,
50 FoRD A L. REv. 533 (1982); R. JENINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 25, at 327-330.
62. See R. JEmNNos & H. MAmSH, supra note 25, at 328 n.1, citing Securities Act Release
No. 33-312 (March 15, 1933); and H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933)
("Reorganizations carried out without such judicial supervision possess all the dangers implicit
in the issuance of new securities and are, therefore, not exempt from the act. For the same
reason, the provision [Section 3(a)(10)] is not broad enough to include mergers or consolidations
of corporations entered into without judicial supervision.").
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:935
C. Section 3(a)(l1): Intrastate Offerings
Section 3(a)(l1) of the Act exempts from registration "any security
which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons residing within
a single State or Territory. '63 The issuer in such an issue must be "a person
residing and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by
and doing business within" that state or territory. 64 Although this exemption
is fairly broad, imposing no limitations on the size of the offering or the
number of offerees and purchasers, and no specific disclosure requirements,
the exemption is a decidedly "local" offering exemption. 65 The rationale
for this basic restriction is that where purely intrastate transactions are
involved, the proximity of issuer and investor to each other, as well as state
regulation, provide sufficient investor protection.6 Because the rationale of
the exemption is rigidly keyed to the local nature of the transaction, any
minor violation of the exemption's locality requirements will cause the
exemption to be lost.67
Because of the broad language in section 3(a)(11) and the narrow
interpretations of its scope by the courts and the SEC, the exemption is
often not a feasible alternative to registration. 6" Rule 147, however, has
somewhat increased the viability of the section as a capital formation
device. 69 Indeed, it was in light of the potential difficulties in complying
with section 3(a)(l1) that the SEC promulgated rule 147, 70 which provides
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982).
64. Id.
65. Section 3(a)(l 1) Exemption for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-4434,
23 Fed. Reg. 498 (Dec. 6, 1961) ("[Tlhe fact should be stressed that section 3(a)(11) is designed
to apply only to distributions genuinely local in character. From a practical point of view, the
provisions of that section can exempt only issues which in reality represent local financing by
local industries, carried out through local investment.").
66. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 602; S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933);
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
67. The pitfalls and restrictions of the exemption are numerous. For example, a mere
offer to a non resident person can invalidate the exemption as to the entire offering. The state
in which the offer is made must not only be the issuer's principal place of business, but also
its state of incorporation, thus eliminating the use of the Delaware corporation. "Resident"
means "domiciled" in the conflict-of-law sense. The securities sold must "come to rest" in
the hands of local residents, meaning that resales by holders who are bona fide local residents
to non residents could well invalidate the exemption. Finally, the issuer must be performing
substantial operational activities in the state of incorporation and the proceeds of the offering
must be used in the state. See generally Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, supra note 65; T.
HAZEN, supra note 15, at 100-105; SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn.
1972).
68. T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 100; Barber, Alternatives for Small Business Raising
Capital Under the Securities Act of 1933, 8 PEPPErsNE L. REv. 899, 927 (1981); Gadsby,
supra note 5, at 148. (SEC Chairman stating that "as a practical matter the intrastate exemption
is loaded with dynamite and must be handled with great care.")
69. Barber, supra note 68, at 927.
70. Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act
Release No. 5450, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270 79,617 (Jan. 7,
1974).
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greater certainty in the compliance process by setting forth objective stan-
dards.7' Notably, the "doing business" requirement of section 3(a)(11) is
satisfied when at least eighty percent of an issuer's gross revenues, assets,
and proceeds of the proposed issue remain situated within the state, and
where the issuer's place of incorporation and principal place of business
are in the state. Additionally, the question whether a security sold pursuant
to this exemption has "come to rest" in the state as required by the section
is satisfied by a nine-month restriction on resale to a non-resident person.72
Further, rule 147, paragraph (b)(2), incorporates a six-month safe harbor
with respect to integration questions.Y Although rule 147 has been criticized
for leaving certain questions open and interpreting section 3(a)(11) incor-
rectly, it is generally well-regarded. 74
D. Section 3(b)
Section 3(b) of the Act empowers the SEC to exempt small offerings
from registration when the aggregate public offering price does not exceed
$5,000,000.75 Although the SEC has promulgated several regulatory exemp-
tions under this section, regulation A and rules 504 and 505 of regulation
D are most pertinent to small businesses.
7 6
Regulation A, which contains rules 251 through 264 and related forms,
was issued pursuant to section 3(b) and allows an issuer to offer securities
71. Id. ("the Commission believes that adoption of the rule ... is in the public interest,
since it will be consistent with the protection of investors and provide, to the extent feasible,
more certainty in determining when the exemption provided by ... [Section 3(a)(11)] is
available.").
72. Id.; see L. Loss, supra note I, at 325-37.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (1988) provides as follows:
For purposes of this rule only, an issue shall be deemed not to include offers, offers
to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions
provided by section 3 or section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration
statement filed under the Act, that take place prior to the six month period
immediately preceding or after the six month period immediately following any
offers, offers for sale or sale pursuant to this rule, Provided, That there are during
either of said six month periods no offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by
or for the issuer of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or
sold pursuant to the rule.
74. See L. Loss, supra note 1, at 334-37 (observing that rule 147 has transferred the
"doing business" test of section 3(a)(11) into a harsher, "triple 80 percent test"; that substantial
liability could flow to the issuer and those assisting it in the offering, and even to good faith
issuers who inadvertently fail to comply with the rule; and that several other exemptions might
better serve an issuer). "Rule 147 makes for considerable certainty. But the exemption is still
no bargain." Id.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1988).
76. Two exemptions under Section 3(b) that will not be discussed in the Article are
regulation B, which provides an exemption for certain fractional interests in undivided oil and
gas rights; and regulation F, which provides an exemption for stock assessments and delinquency
sales of assessable stock. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.300-.346, .651-.656 (1988). There are also
several other rules. See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 112; ABA Report, supra note
22, at 609-10; L. Loss, supra note 1, at 344-48.
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in an aggregate amount not exceeding $1,500,000 million dollars in any
given year. 77 Regulation A is the oldest regulatory exemption under section
3(b). The regulation is available to issuers in the United States and Canada,
requires simpler documentation than that of the registration process, allows
the use of unaudited financial statements, and permits the filing of disclosure
documents in SEC regional offices rather than at the national office in
Washington, D.C. 7 Therefore, compliance with regulation A is generally
less expensive and less time consuming than compliance with the general
registration requirements.
7 9
Because of the more liberal notification, filing, and disclosure require-
ments, the regulation A offering process has been referred to as a "short
form" or "mini" registration. s° There are significant differences, however,
between this exemption and actual registration, including differences in the
potential liabilities.8 ' Today, the presence of more convenient exemptions
such as those under regulation D, as well as the streamlined registration
process available through the use of form S-18, has brought about a decrease
in the use of regulation A.12
E. Section 4(2)
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts "transactions not involving any
public offering" from registration. 3 Offerings under this exemption are
commonly known as "private placements." Section 4(2) was drafted by
Congress to apply in situations "where there is no practical need for [the
bill's] application or where the public benefits are too remote. 8 s4 Because
neither the language of this self-executing statutory exemption nor its
77. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-264 (1988).
78. Id.
79. See generally Burge, Regulation A: A Review and a Look at Recent Developments,
46 L.A. B. BULL. 290 (1971); Frank, The Processing of Small Issues of Securities Under
Regulation A, 1962 DuKE L.J. 507; Green & Brecher, When Making a Small Public Offering
Under Regulation A (With Forms), 26 PPAc. LAW. No. 2, 25-40, pts. 1-2; Weiss, Highways
and Byways Revisited, 15 N.Y. L. F. 218 (1969); Weiss, Regulation A Under the Securities
Act of 1933-Highways and Byways, 8 N.Y. L. F. 3 (1962).
80. L. Loss, supra note 1, at 340; T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 112.
81. T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 112-13. Although the procedures and content of the
documents are similar to "full-blown" registrations, the bases of liability for material mis-
statements and omissions are not the same. Title 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a)
(1982), as well as section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)
(1982) and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.105-5 (1988), are the means available to redress such
grievances. Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982), is available only for bona
fide registrations.
82. T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 118-19 ("Many issuers who might otherwise rely on a
Regulation A exemption may avail themselves of the streamlined registration for issuers
qualifying to use Form S-18.").
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
84. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6, 15-16 (1933).
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legislative history cast much light on its scope, the SEC and the courts have
further developed the scope of the exemption .
5
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 6 the United States Supreme Court
rendered what is still the most enduring judicial interpretation of section
4(2). In Ralston the Supreme Court required that all offerees in an offering
under the 4(2) exemption (1) have access to the kind of information that
would be made available in an actual registration statement; 7 and (2) be
"sophisticated," that is, be able to obtain and comprehend the information
made available to them and, in general, "fend for themselves.""8 The Court
also stated that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, no quantitative
limit is set on the number of offerees permitted in an offering under the
exemption, and that the burden of proof that an exemption applies is on
the issuer."9 These guidelines remain the basis for all section 4(2) private
placements. But even this Supreme Court guidance is very broad, and issuers
are relegated to considerable uncertainty when they attempt to issue securities
under the section 4(2) exemption. In response to this problem, as well as a
similar problem under section 3(b), the SEC issued regulation D.
F. Regulation D
Regulation D, which became effective April 15, 1982, is a comprehensive
exemptive scheme for small issues and small issuers. 90 It is the result of a
study conducted by the SEC that "revealed a particular concern that the
85. See R. JENNINGS & H. MA:ssH, supra note 25, at 233-235; L. Loss, supra note 1, at
349 ("These nine words ["transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"] support
a substantial gloss. The legislative history is of little help.").
86. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
87. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 110, 127 (1953) ("The focus of the inquiry
should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration."); see
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
88. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125 ("Since exempt transactions are those as to
which 'there is no practical need for [the bill's] application,' the applicability of § 4(1) [now
§ 4(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of
the Act."). See Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933-Transactions
By an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 5487,
1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974).
89. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125-27. The number of securities offered, the size
of the offering and the presence of public advertising will be considered in determining the
validity of any claim to an exemption. See T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at 130; Statement of the
Commission Regarding Limitations of the Availability of So-Called "Private Offering Exemp-
tion," Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 2770-2783 (Nov. 6, 1962).
90. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1988). See generally Berkeley & Churm, An Analysis of
Different Financings Under Regulation D, 10 ALI-ABA CouRSE MATERI As J. 101 (1985);
Elkins & Meeks, Regulation D, 51 C.P.S. (BNA) (1986); Parnall, Kohl & Huff, Private and
Limited Offerings After a Decade of Experimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12
N.M. L. Rav. 633 (1982); Warren, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen
for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 Am. U. L. REv. 355 (1984); Note,
Regulation D. Coherent Exemptions for Small Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933,
24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 121 (1982).
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registration requirements and the exemptive scheme of the Securities Act
impose disproportionate restraints on small issuers." 9' "[D]esigned to sim-
plify and clarify existing exemptions, to expand their availability, and to
achieve uniformity between federal and state exemptions," regulation D
consists of seven preliminary notes and rules 501 through 506.92 Rules 504,
505, and 506 of regulation D are three separate exemptions from the section
5-registration requirement, while rules 501 through 503 contain certain
definitions, terms, and conditions applicable to the three exemptions. 93
Rule 501 sets forth seven definitions that apply generally throughout
regulation D. The terms defined are: "accredited investor," "affiliate,"
"aggregate offering price," "business combination," "executive officer,"
"issuer," and "purchaser representative." This rule also sets forth certain
tests for determining who is a "purchaser" under rules 505(b) and 506(b),
which have a 35-purchaser limitation.
From the issuer's perspective, the definition of "accredited investor" in
rule 501 is crucial, because (1) accredited investors do not have to be
counted in the 35-purchaser limit of rules 505 and 506; (2) when all
purchasers are accredited investors, no specific disclosure is required under
rule 502(b); and (3) when the offering is made under rule 506, only non-
accredited investors must meet the "sophistication" test. 94
Rule 502 establishes four limiting conditions that apply to all registra-
tion-exempt offerings made under rules 504, 505 and 506. The first condi-
tion, rule 502(a), sets forth the integration doctrine, establishes the six-
month safe harbor, and establishes the five-factor test of SEC Release No.
33-4552 as the formula for determining whether offerings not meeting the
six-month safe harbor should be integrated. The remaining conditions set
forth disclosure requirements, limitations on the manner of offering, in-
cluding a prohibition on general solicitation or advertising, and limitations
on resale.
95
Rule 503 sets forth the requirement that notice of sales effected under
regulation D must be filed with the SEC. Pursuant to SEC Release No. 33-
91. Regulation D-Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration Under the Securities
Act of 1933 for Transactions involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No.
6389, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1988). See Elkins & Meeks, supra note 90, at A-14.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1988). The six-month integration safe harbor of Rule 502(a)
provides as follows:
Integration. All sales that are part of the same Regulation D offering must meet all
of the terms and conditions of Regulation D. Offers and sales that are made more
than six months before the start of a Regulation D offering or are made more than
six months after completion of a Regulation D offering will not be considered part
of that Regulation D offering, so long as during those six month periods there are
no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the same or a similar
class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other than those offers or sales
of securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in Rule 405 under the Act
[17 C.F.R. 230.405].
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6663, issued in late 1986, only an initial notice filing within fifteen days
after the first sale of securities is necessary. In that release the SEC also
adopted a new form D, which will facilitate coordinated filings with the
states. 9
6
Rule 504 provides an exemption under section 3(b) of the Act for certain
offers and sales not exceeding an aggregate offering price of $500,000. Rule
504 replaces rule 240, which exempted sales up to $100,000 to 100 investors,
and requires that all proceeds from sales of securities within the previous
twelve months under section 3(b) or in violation of section 5(a) of the Act
be included in the aggregate offering price limitation. Although there are
no specific disclosure requirements under rule 504, the issuer still is subject
to federal antifraud and civil liabilities, as well as state securities provisions.
With certain exceptions, the general requirements of rules 501 through 503
also apply.
97
Rule 505, promulgated under the authority of section 3(b), exempts
offers and sales to no more than thirty-five purchasers who are not accred-
ited, when the aggregate offering price over twelve months does not exceed
$5,000,000. Rule 505 replaces rule 242, which allowed sales aggregating
$2,000,000 to an unlimited number of accredited persons, as well as to no
more than thirty-five nonaccredited purchasers. As in rule 504, the aggregate
offering price under a rule 505 offering must include proceeds from offers
and sales of securities made twelve months prior to and during the rule 505
offering in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b) or in violation of
section 5(a). Issuers making an offering under rule 505 are subject to the
general terms and conditions of rules 501 through 503.98
Rule 506 exempts offers and sales of securities by issuers to no more
than thirty-five purchasers other than accredited investors. There is no dollar
limitation on the amount of capital that can be raised under this exemption.
Rule 506 replaces the somewhat limited rule 146, and unlike rules 504 and
505, which were promulgated under section 3(b), rule 506's statutory basis
is section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Issuers relying on rule 506 must comply
with the general terms and conditions of rules 501-503-just as they must
under rules 504 and 505-but in addition, they must reasonably believe that
each nonaccredited investor, either alone or along with a purchaser repre-
sentative, is sophisticated enough to evaluate the investment properly.99
While regulation D has been the target of various criticisms and pro-
posed revisions, its adoption generally has been regarded as a significant
step in improving capital formation opportunities for small issuers. °°
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1988).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1988); see Elkins & Meeks, supra note 90, at A-15, 16.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1988); see Elkins & Meeks, supra note 90, at A-16.
99. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988); see Elkins &-Meeks, supra note 90, at A-16.
100. See generally Campbell, supra note 1 (calling Regulation D "commendable attempt
at balance," but recommending that SEC address specific areas in which various provisions
of regulation created "problems [that] are especially difficult for small issuers."). The specific
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G. Section 4(6)
Section 4(6) of the 1933 Act was enacted in 1980 to provide an exemption
from registration for offers or sales of securities by an issuer solely to so-
called "accredited investors." The aggregate offering price of an issue under
this exemption may not exceed the maximum amount allowable under section
3(b) of the Act, which is at present $5,000,000. Nor may an issuer conduct
"advertising or public solicitation in connection with" any issuance made
pursuant to section 4(6). Finally, form D, the required notice form for all
regulation D offerings, must be filed for any sales made in reliance on
section 4(6). 1
In view of the subsequent promulgation of regulation D, particularly
rule 505, section 4(6) has had only limited use. Rule 505 operates under
terms substantially similar to section 4(6), except that compliance with rule
505 is less burdensome. 02
recommendations are as follows:
(1) eliminate regulation D's prohibition against general advertising;
(2) adjust the disclosure requirements of regulation D;
(3) modify the resale restrictions of rule 144;
(4) eliminate the integration concept.
Id. at 134-136; see also Warren, supra note 90, at 378-84. Warren similarly refers to the SEC's
promulgation of regulation D as "commendable," but criticizes that effort for having "pre-
served and created defects in its restructured exemption scheme for limited offerings." Id. at
379. Specifically, Professor Warren attacks (1) the disparity between the suitability criteria for
non-accredited investors in rules 505 and 506 ("sophistication" test required for rule 506
investors but not for rule 505 investors); (2) the definition of "accredited investor" in rule
501(a) (allows accreditation based solely on net worth, income, or amount of purchase; these
tests provide no real guarantee that an investor "can evaluate the merits and risks of a
prospective investment ... [or] that the investor can bear the risks of losing the invested
fund"); and (3) the failure of regulation D to include a "substantial compliance" test for
satisfying each exemption's requirements ("Regulation D is an extremely technical and complex
set of rules. Unfortunately, technical failure to satisfy the requirements would ... [cause the
issuer to be] forced out of its 'safe harbor' and into the rough seas of the section 4(2)
exemption."). Id. at 379-383.
Finally, on January 16, 1987, the SEC issued Securities Act Release No. 33-6683, which
proposes several amendments to regulation D, including expansion of the definition of
"accredited investor," elevation of the ceiling on rule 504 offerings (under certain circum-
stances) to $1,000,000, and inclusion of a "good faith" test for compliance with regulation
D. Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act
Release No. 6683, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. Rep. (CCH) 84,054 (Jan. 16, 1987).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982). The key term here, of course, is "accredited investor."
SEC Rule 215 (17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1988)) interprets section 2(15)(ii) of the 1933 Act, (15
U.S.C. § 77b(15)(88) (1982)) to define the term as including eight categories of the offerees
and purchasers. Essentially, they fall into three categories: certain institutional investors;
"insiders" of the issuer, and certain wealthy individuals. See T. HAZEN, supra note 15, at
126-27.
102. See Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sale, Securities Act
Release No. 6339, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,014 (Aug. 7, 1981)
(regulation D "may provide a more attractive alternative to registration for smaller issuers"
than section 4(6)); Elkins & Meeks, supra note 90, at A-6 (citing Securities Act Release No.
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IV. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE
A. Administrative Action
1. SEC Rules, Regulations, and Rulings
The integration doctrine was created and applied soon after the 1933
Act became effective. On December 28, 1933, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)Q 03 ruled that an attempt to sell securities pursuant to the intrastate
offering exemption would be integrated, into a registered offering of the
same class of securities that was under FTC review. o4 A registration state-
ment covering all the securities in controversy already had been filed in that
matter before the issuer decided to sell some of the securities separately.
05
It was not clear why the issuer wanted to carve out a portion of the entire
offering and sell it to local purchasers prior to the public sale.
In what was to become the usual pattern in agency rulings and statements
on integration matters, the government's response was brief, with very little
helpful analysis or guidance. The issuer simply was admonished that it must
either use a valid exemption for the entire offering or register that offering;
a combination of the two would constitute a violation of the 1933 Act.'0
Perhaps the issuer believed that the separate intrastate offering was
necessary to provide crucial "bridge" financing in aid of the public offering.
Whether or not this was the case, the FTC denied the issuer an important
capital formation opportunity without the benefit of a clear explanation or
33-6339 and noting that (1) nonaccredited investors can participate in regulation D offerings
but not in section 4(6) offerings, and (2) under section 4(6), a subjective "reasonable belief"
that one is an accredited investor is not sufficient, while such is sufficient under regulation
D).
103. Prior to creation of the SEC in 1934, the FTC administered the 1933 Act. The SEC
was created by section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982). See
Morrissey, supra note 20, at 160 n. 131. (Section 2(5) of the 1933 Act was amended by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, Section 210, 48 Stat. 881, 908(1934) to
accomplish the transfer of authority and establishment of the SEC).
104. Extracts from Letters of Federal Trade Commission Relating to Applications of
Various Sections of the Act, Securities Act Release No. 97, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1021-
1029 (Dec. 28, 1933).
105. 11 Fed. Reg. 10,950 (1946).
106. Id.; Deaktor, supra note 9, at 493 (citing following excerpt and noting that in Release
No. 97 "Itlhe FTC's response launched the application of integration in conclusory, ambiguous
terms"):
The Securities Act will not permit you to use the malls inside the state of X for the
sale of securities until a registration statement is effective unless, in accordance with
the provisions of section [3(a)(11)] the entire issue is to be sold to residents of that
state. It is understood that you plan to sell part of the issue to non-residents of X
as soon as the registration statement becomes effective. If this is done, the conditions
of section [3(a)(l1)] will not be met, and any use of the mails for sales within the
state pending an effective registration will be a violation of the Act.
11 Fed. Reg. at 10,950.
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analysis of the alleged threat to investor protection. Indeed, it is possible
that the FTC's denial of the issuer's financing proposal accomplished no
protection for investors. One can only conclude that the ruling reflects a
rather mechanical and superficial application of the issue concept, with an
accompanying bias toward registration. Nonetheless, the integration doctrine
was launched, and the principle of the sanctity of the single issue or offering
was fundamental to the doctrine and its rationale.'07 Two years after the
FTC's conception of the integration doctrine, the newly instituted SEC
adopted the doctrine in In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp.,0 s affirm-
ing the use of the single issue concept in a matter in which the issuer had
claimed an exemption under Section 3(a)(11).
During these early years of the doctrine's evolution, the SEC promul-
gated rule 152, which provides as follows:
The phrase "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering" in section 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions
not involving any public offering at the time of said transactions
although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public
offering and/or files a registration statement.' °9
Rule 152 allows issuers to avoid integration with some degree of certainty
when a section 4(2) private placement is followed by a registered offering." 0
The shortcomings of the rule are (1) its limited application, given the
universe of possible offering combinations and needs; and (2) the literal
requirement that the issuer actually decide to effect a registered offering
107. Deaktor, supra note 9, at 492:
Underlying the scheme of transactional exemptions in sections 3 and 4 of the
1933 Act is a theoretical assumption that firm's past financial transactions can be
separated into distinct and identifiable issues. The premise is explicit in several
provisions. For instance, section 3(a)(11) exempts only those securities which are
"part of an issue" offered and sold intrastate. Section 3(b) similarly is restricted in
its application to an "issue" of securities with an offering price not in excess of
$2,000,000 [now $5,000,000]. Despite the obvious significance of the issue concept,
the vast array of variables that attend financial transactions has generated difficulty
in its practical application.
Implementation of the issue concept entails a determination whether a series of
securities offerings constitutes one or more transactions. The concept itself had been
interpreted at an early date to require that the transaction be registered or that all
activities conducted in furtherance of a transaction or issue of securities strictly
conform to the requirements of a single exemption. Integration is the logical extension
of the notion that an issuer should not be allowed to circumvent an exemption's
requirements by resorting to a combination of transactional exemptions to insulate
what would otherwise be a nonexempt public offering from the 1933 Act's registration
provisions. Likewise, an issuer should not be permitted to effect an otherwise
nonexempt public offering by making a partially registered and partially exempt
issue.
Id. at 492 (footnotes omitted).
108. 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1988).
110. ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1594-95.
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"subsequent" to the private offering, which clearly discourages sound
financial planning."' Two recent SEC Staff no-action letters, however,
appear to have eliminated the necessity that an issuer actually defer a
decision to effect a public offering." 2
Not until the SEC's decision in In re Unity Gold Corp. I" did government
pronouncements on integration begin to articulate anything approaching an
analytical scheme. In Unity Gold the SEC integrated an offering made
under rule 202, which was a predecessor of regulation A, with a registered
offering of securities of the same class for which a registration statement
had been filed two months after the exempt offering." 4 Invoking the issue
concept, as well as the SEC's resolve that exemptions should not be abused,
the SEC supported its ruling that the two offerings were in effect one issue,
and thus the section 3(b) exemption was unavailable, with the following
language:
The manifest purpose of the $100,000 proviso contained in Section
3(b) of the Act is to limit the exercises of the Commission's
exempting power to cases of small financing. It follows that the
proviso cannot be construed to permit the exemption of small
portions of large financing operations. This would defeat its very
purpose. Thus, securities of the same class, offered on the same
general terms to the public in an uninterrupted program of distri-
bution, cannot be segregated into separate "issues" merely'by
claiming an exemption for a limited portion of such shares under
Rule 202, or under any other rules of the Commission adopted in
accordance with Section 3(b) of the Act, and registering the re-
mainder. Nor can this be accomplished, it may be noted, by the
mere formality of filing successive prospectuses under one or more
of these rules if in fact the shares thereby offered otherwise con-
stitute a single "issue" within the meaning of Section 3(b)." 5
Most importantly, the SEC in Unity Gold specified six factors that it
would use in determining whether certain ostensibly separate offerings should
be integrated:
111. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 611; Stevenson, supra note 10, at 55.
112. See Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407 (Dec. 31, 1986)(extending rule 152 application to rule 506 of
regulation D); Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 12, 1986.
113. 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938).
114. In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938). This ruling resulted in a stop
order, under section 8(d) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d), directed at the issuer's plan to
offer registered securities. The registration statement contained an assertion that the earlier
offering was in compliance with section 3(b) exemption requirements; because the offerings
were integrated, their total dollar value exceeded the $100,000 exemption ceiling, and thus,
that exemption was not available. This in turn made the assertion in the registration statement
false and misleading, subjecting the issuer to liability and the resultant stop order.
115. Id.
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(1) whether the plan to distribute the securities includes, in addition,
the distribution of other securities;
(2) the methods of sale and distribution;
(3) the classes of securities offered;
(4) the general terms on which the securities were offered;
(5) the timing of the offerings; and
(6) the use of proceeds of the offerings."
6
Although the Unity Gold decision provided more objective standards in
assessing integration than had previously existed, the SEC failed to define
certain key terminology, explain the relative weights the factors should be
given, or state whether all factors must be present for integration to take
place. 1 7 Nonetheless, the United Gold decision has had a substantial impact
on the subsequent development of the integration doctrine."
8
After the initial agency rulings on integration in the 1930s, there was
very little activity until the early 1960s when the SEC promulgated Release
Nos. 4434 and 4552." 9 These releases retained essentially the same factors
for integration as Unity Gold, except for the factor concerning similarities
in sale and distribution methods. These factors evaluate whether the offer-
ings at issue (1) are part of a single plan of financing; (2) involve the
issuance of the same class of security; (3) are made at or about the same
time; (4) require the same kind of consideration to be received; and (5) are
being made for the same general purpose. 2 0 Like the factors of Unity Gold,
however, these factors have been criticized for their failure to provide real
guidance as to the precise definitions of the factors or the interrelationship
and relative weighting of the factors. Moreover, the introductory language
116. Id. The SEC noted that
[t]he determination whether securities are being offered as part of a single "issue"
will depend upon a consideration of various factors concerning the methods of sale
and distribution employed to effect the offerings and the disposition of the proceeds.
If the offerings may be segregated into separate blocks, as evidenced by material
differences in the use of the proceeds, in the manner and terms of distribution, and
in similar related details, each offering will be a separate "issue." In the main, of
course, each case must be determined upon the basis of its own facts.
Id.
117. See ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1594; Deaktor, supra note 9, at 495;
Opinion of General Counsel on Exemption of Refunding Issues Where Unsubscribed Portion
Will Be Sold to the Public For Cash, Securities Act Release No. 2029, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 2140-2141 (Aug. 8, 1939) (expanding doctrine's application to private placements
under section 4(2) and stating that not all factors set forth in Unity Gold are necessary to
integration analysis).
118. Probably the best examples of Unity Gold's impact are Securities Act Release Nos.
4434 and 4552. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; infra note 119.
119. Exemption for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 2165.103, 2270-2277 (Dec. 6, 1961); Announcement of Statement Regarding Avail-
ability of Non-public Offering Exemption from Registration Requirements, Securities Act
Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962); see supra notes 24-25
and accompanying text.
120. Id.
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of the two releases was not consistent, with Release No. 4434 stating that
"[a]ny one or more of the ... factors may be determinative," and Release
No. 4552 stating that "[t]he following factors are relevant." This discrepancy
only added to the confusion and uncertainty in answering integration
questions. 121
Because of the continuing problem of vagueness in the formulas for
resolving integration problems, the SEC included six-month integration safe
harbors when it promulgated rules. 146 and 147 under sections 4(2) and
3(a)(11) respectively. 2 2 Rule 146(b)(1) now has been rescinded and replaced
by a similar six-month safe harbor, rule 502(a) of regulation D.1
2 1
Notwithstanding the beneficial nature of the safe harbor provisions of
rules 147 (b)(2) and 502(a), certain deficiencies in the safe harbor concept
have been recognized: safe harbors do not apply to all exemptions, they
discourage efforts to improve the overall analytical scheme, and the interval
chosen is arbitrary and therefore may unnecessarily hinder capital formation
needs of businesses with high or unpredictable capital requirements.
24
2. SEC No-Action Letters
In February, 1971, the SEC staff began responding to specific, fact-
based inquiries concerning statutes, rules, and regulations administered by
the SEC.'12 These responses and the inquiries generating them are termed
"no-action letters." And while they do not represent formal action by the
SEC, no-action letters are available to the public 126 and generally have been
relied upon by securities practitioners in the continuing effort to ascertain
the law regarding matters such as integration of securities offerings! 27
121. See supra note 25, and accompanying text. In particular, see Deaktor, supra note 9,
at 541: "The formula, however, appears insufficiently focused to provide guidance for the
structuring of complex financial arrangements. The generality of its language and the existence
of substantial overlaps in the factors engender confusion."
122. See Securities Act Release No. 5487, supra note 88, 2710 (adopting rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1979)); Securities Act Release No. 5450, supra note 70, 79,617 (adopting
rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987)). The integration safe harbors were set forth in rules
146(b)(1) and 147(b)(2). Except for the fact that rule 147(b)(2) uses the term "issue" (consistent
with its statutory basis) and rule 1460b)(1) uses the term "offering," the language of the two
rules is identical. The language of rule 147(b)(2) is quoted supra in note 73.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 230.520(a)(1988). For a general discussion of the evolution of regulation
D from rules such as rule 146, see Parnall, supra note 90. The language of rule 502(a) appears
supra in note 95.
124. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
125. Securities Act Release No. 5098 supra note 20, 77,921 (adopting 17 C.F.R. §
200.81, 202.2 (1988)); see supra note 20, authorities cited therein, and accompanying text.
126. Note also that the staff will respond to requests for interpretations of SEC statutes,
rules and regulations; these responses, termed "interpretative letters," are often also called
"no action letters." See Morrissey, supra note 20, at 165 n. 176; Lowenfels, SEC No-Action
Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REv.
303, 304 (1973).
127. Procedures Utilized by Division of Corporate Finance for Rendering Informal Advice,
Securities Act Release No. 6253, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 373 (Oct. 28, 1980); Deaktor,
supra note 9, at 526.
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But in the integration doctrine area, staff no-action letter responses
generally have left practitioners unsatisfied about how to analyze a particular
problem. The following quote from the ABA Report aptly summarizes the
confusion wrought by no-action letters:
Thus, the Staff's no-action letters and interpretative responses show
that the explicit principles the Staff developed to guide its decisions
on questions of integration are all too often inadequate to handle
the hard cases presented. As a result, the Staff has often decided
on the basis of considerations other than those explicitly given as
the principles to be applied in such cases. In the "offering integra-
tion" letters, for example, the Staff claimed to apply a five-factor
test, when often only one factor was even nominally decisive and
even its application was sometimes ambiguous and uncertain. In
the "venture" and "issuer" integration letters, the five criteria of
Release No. 4552 seem secondary to whether the securities seem to
have a common issuer, and even in these letters, the apparent risk
of the offering seems to have a determining effect upon the Staff's
position on this question. Thus, the Staff's letters have contributed
little toward the understanding of this complex issue, which may
explain why the Staff discontinued such letters from 1979 through
1984.128
Although the no-action letters, as noted above, generally have been
regarded as confusing and inconsistent, commentators have discerned certain
128. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 622-23.
The staff's decision to discontinue issuance of no-action letters may have been a result
of the failures in clarity and consistency of the no-action letters. See Clover Financial Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 5, 1979) ("Because of the complexity of the proposed arrangements
and the possibility that staff positions on the integration concept may be misconstrued and
misapplied in other situations, we will not be issuing interpretations in this area any longer.")
The staff resumed the no-action letter practice in 1985. See 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
403 (1985).
Other commentators have reached the same conclusion about the staff's responses to no-
action letter inquiries. For example, Stevenson, supra note 10, at .50 states:
Unfortunately, many of the no-action positions are difficult to reconcile. The staff
typically purports to follow the "analysis" of Release No. 4552. In general, however,
the letters shed little light on the weight to be given the factors set forth in the
release or how they are to be used in arriving at a conclusion on any particular
issue. Indeed, the staff occasionally appears to have abandoned the factors in favor
of one or more other considerations not mentioned in the release.
See also Morrissey, supra note 20, at 165 ("If considered as a coherent body of law, the
letters pose ... problems ... [T]he letters are often difficult to harmonize even when they
deal with analogous situations. They typically contain little reasoning or elaboration on the
basis for the staff's opinion."); Deaktor, supra note 9, at 541 ("[T]hese nebulous factors and
admonitions against fragmenting a single transaction are the extent of the perspective provided
by the SEC's formal and informal actions.").
Two extensive discussions of the staff's no-action letters on integration appear in the
ABA Report, supra note 22, at 617-623, and in the Deaktor article, supra note 9, at 525-46.
For this reason, this Article will not attempt yet another discussion of the same subject.
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notable patterns. For example, in the most basic category of integration,
"offering integration," which involves only one issuer with the focus being
on multiple issues of that issuer, 29 staff no-action letters have emphasized
the "general purpose" factor of Release No. 4552 in private placements
and intrastate offerings. 30 These letters hopefully indicate that not all five
factors of the release must be satisfied for offerings to be integrated, but
they also raise important questions concerning the relative weight to be
accorded the various factors. 3 '
Additionally, the cases arising under section 3(a)(3) of the Act, which
provides an exemption for sales of commercial paper, similarly seem to
place emphasis on the purpose of the offerings, but tend toward a nonin-
tegration position regardless of the purposes articulated. The real basis for
staff decisions under this exemption seems not to be the five-factor test at
all, but the "absence of a need for further investor protection [than that
already provided in the exemptions themselves] in ... circumstances that
typically involve unspeculative securities and sophisticated institutional inves-
tors." 132
Another category of integration problems which has developed centers
on "venture integration." Venture integration occurs when the offerings of
ostensibly different issuers are deemed a single offering because the issuers,
although separate legal entities, conduct projects that are closely related.
33
Often these entities are limited partnerships, frequently with a common
general partner, engaged in the exploitation of mineral rights. 3 4 The absence
of any clearly articulated standard in integration problems is also a source
of anxiety in this arena, because the SEC staff seems to have developed a
special, more stringent test for oil and gas financings.135 Apparently, the
129. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 617-23; Stevenson, supra note 10, at 51-57
(discussing the terms "offering," "venture," and "issuer" integration).
130. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 618-17 (citing Wellington Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (Aug. 23, 1976); Rosenberg Capital Management, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 19,
1979); DeLorean Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter (June 14, 1976); UST Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 23, 1977); Cactus Beef, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 5, 1971)).
131. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 619.
132. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 620; Stevenson, supra note 10, at 52. In
Stevenson's article he states, regarding the "general purpose" and "single plan of financing"
factors: "neither seems related in any discernible way to the need of investors for the protection
of registration." Id. But see Deaktor, supra note 9, at 539 n.413 (stating that "[t]he difference
in the general purposes of the offerings is the primary basis for this [no-action] position.").
Examples cited in the ABA Report include First Merchants Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(July 27, 1978); Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (July 13, 1977); Alabama
Bancorporation, SEC No-Action Letter (June 8, 1977); Security Pac. Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (Oct. 14, 1976); Liberty Nat'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (May 21, 1976).
133. Stevenson, supra note 10, at 56; ABA Report, supra note 22, at 620.
134. Id.
135. ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1605-06 ("It appears to have been easier
for the staff to find separate projects, and therefore discrete transactions, if real estate, horses,
or shopping center booths, rather than oil and'gas properties, were involved."); ABA Report,
supra note 22, at 620-21.
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SEC bases its stringent test on a sub silentio attempt to shield investors
from "perceived risks of mineral exploration ventures, even when registra-
tion issues [are] not truly present."' 13 6 Moreover, there are inconsistencies
even in the outcomes generated under this unarticulated scheme. Two no-
action letters aptly demonstrate this point. In JIC Drilling Cos. 137 the staff
denied a no-action letter request to offerings by two oil and gas limited
partnerships that had common general partners and drilling partners and
were conducting operations in two separate states. In Martin Exploration
Co.'38 the staff took a no-action position with respect to financing plans by
two limited partnerships that had a structure similar to-but no more
independent than-the ones in JIC Drilling Cos. In Martin, all drilling
operations were to take place in the same state-some as close as twelve
miles apart. 3 9 Clearly, such inconsistencies in SEC responses do not further
the refinement of the integration doctrine.
"Issuer integration" presents yet another type of integration problem
to which the SEC has responded inconsistently. Issuer integration may result
where separate, but closely related, issuers attempt contemporaneous fi-
nancings. 40 The staff's responses in this area reflect those in the offering
and venture integration areas in terms of inconsistencies. Two common
threads of note, however, are the special treatment of mineral exploration
ventures (mirroring the venture integration staff responses) and the emphasis
on the extent to which the issuers' financial risks are independent of one
another. 141
Certain recent no-action letter responses have been a source of both
relief and concern to issuers seeking to avoid integration problems. 142 In
LaserFax, Inc.,143 the staff denied a no-action letter request when the issuer
previously had sold common stock pursuant to a private offering exemption,
and was proposing to sell (within six months) convertible subordinated
debentures under regulation D, followed by a second sale of common stock
(within six months of the regulation D offering) to the public through a
registered offering.'4 The staff, relying on Release No. 4552, rejected the
issuer's interpretation of its right to proceed, stating that the offerings would
136. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 621; ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at
1606.
137. JIC Drilling Cos., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,765 (Aug.
23, 1976)
138. Martin Exploration Co, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 7, 1976).
139. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 56. These grossly inconsistent responses were issued
only two weeks apart.
140. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 621-23; Stevenson, supra note 10, at 57.
141. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 621-22.
142. The responses are: LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 15, 1985); Sonnen-
blick, Parker & Selvers, SEC No-Action Letter (May 3, 1985); Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (Dec. 31, 1986); Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 31, 1986). See
generally Sachs & Cowan, supra note 32.
143. LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 15, 1985).
144. Id.
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consist of essentially the same class of stock; there was a single plan of
financing; the funds raised would be used primarily for the single purpose
of "business operations"; and the offerings all would have occurred less
than six months from one another.
45
The LaserFax letter caused considerable concern among practitioners,
probably because the issuer's plan to sell convertible debentures, which are
seemingly a different class of securities from common stock, as well as the
absence of any unusually risky elements in the financing dynamics, would
seem to have made integration undesirable.14 At an ABA Small Business
Committee meeting, an SEC official later explained informally that the SEC
always has focused on the purpose of the offering and type of securities in
its analyses. Moreover, explained the official, the issuer in this instance had
been unspecific about which part of regulation D would be relied upon to
justify the registration exemption. 47
In Sonnenblick,14' the SEC staff denied a no-action letter request
regarding a plan by a proposed start-up issuer to raise capital through a
rule 504 common stock offering and a subsequent registered public offering
of common stock conducted within six months of the initial 504 offering. 49
The staff's response identified the most important factors of Release No.
4552:
The Division considers the factors enumerated in Securities Act
Release No. 4552 to be relevant to a determination of whether a
series of transactions must be integrated for purposes of registration
under the 1933 Act. In the instant case, we have noted particularly
that the proposed offerings are part of a single plan of financing
in that the issuer anticipates the need for the capital from both
offerings in order to go forward with its operations. Further we
are unable to conclude from your letters that there are any factors
distinguishing the purposes of the two offerings. While we consider
those factors to be most important to a determination whether to
integrate the offerings discussed in your letter, we also note that
the sales will involve issuance of the same class of securities,
common stock; the sales will be made at or about the same time,
within a six month period; and, although the price per share may
vary in the offerings, the same type of consideration, cash, will be
received.
We also note that the offerees in the Rule 504 offering are not
limited to those possessing first-hand information with respect to
145. Id.
146. See Real Estate Syndicates Ask Staff to Consider Reg. D. Charges, 18 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 590, 591 (Apr. 25, 1986) ("The LaserFax letter 'caused a lot of stir.' ")
147. Id. at 591. (description of comments on the letter by Mary E. T. Beach, Associate
Director of the Corporate Finance Division, on April 3, 1986, at a meeting of the ABA Small
Business Committee).
148. Sonnenblick, Parker & Selvers, SEC No-Action Letter (May 3, 1985).
149. Id. (staff response).
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the proposed venture who ai e providing capital for organization
and preliminary operations.sc
Thus, the staff acknowledged the greater relative importance of the
"plan of financing" and "general purpose" factors in its analysis. The
staff also was forthcoming about its use of some policy analysis regarding
the presence of a need to protect the potential investors. The staff relied
on similar considerations in the LaserFax letter.
15'
In Verticom, Inc.,152 the staff finally granted a no-action letter request.
But rather than rely on Release No. 4552, as it had in Sonnenbiick and
LaserFax, the staff chose the more vague and less analytical test of rule
152, expressly disavowing any reliance on Release No. 4552.- 3 The issuer,
a high-tech start-up company located in northern California's Silicon Valley,
had raised most of its funds through venture capital investors pursuant to
private offering exemptions. Its inquiry letter focused on its plan to make
one more private offering, pursuant to sectiori 4(2), before effecting a
registered public offering of common stock. The issuer characterized the
planned private offering as part of the "venture financing phase," while
the public offering was denominated as part of a "public financing phase."
The first phase was intended to get the issuer started and operating, while
the next phase was for expansion purposes.
5 4
While the SEC staff's decision to rely on rule 152 as the basis for its
response was not inappropriate, the staff clearly declined the opportunity
to clarify the application of Release No. 4552. Indeed, had the staff applied
the release in Verticom, in which the financing was well planned, well
presented, and provided substantial guarantees of investor protection, issuers
would have been able to use the staff's response as a model to compare
with cases in which the financing plans were not as well planned, such as
in LaserFax and Sonnenblick. 155 Perhaas in Verticom the staff was reluctant
to attempt an analysis under the release because, although the level of
investor protection and general quality of the issuer's operations were high,
the general purpose factor and possibly the plan of financing factor might
have pointed toward integrating the offerings. Such a potential conflict,
under a Release No. 4552 analysis, is especially possible in light of the
undefined, overlapping terms of the release and the prior conflicting res-
ponses of the staff. 5 6 These potential conflicts may have encouraged the
150. Id.
151. See supra note 143, LaserFax letter.
152. Verticom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 31, 1986).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. The reader should compare the structure and planning of the three issuers' proposals,
as well as the thoroughness and quality of the counsels' letters of inquiry.
156. The purpose behind a financing plan and the actual plan of financing are often
indistinguishable. Moreover, the lack of definition between a financing plan and the plan's
purpose further frustrates matters. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 52. Stevenson writes that,
"The 'single plan of financing' test and the 'same general purpose' test are obviously closely
related. In many no-action letters they appear to be interchangeable." Id.
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staff to avoid any analysis under the release. In any event, aside from the
greater investor protection guarantees inherent in the facts of Verticom and
the failure of counsel for the issuer in LaserFax to state specifically that
rule 506 would be relied upon in the private offering, the two cases are
difficult to reconcile.
57
Despite the fact that the Verticom response is not easily reconcilable
with responses like LaserFax, the staff's position in Verticom is quite
significant. In Verticom the rule 152 requirement that, to avoid integration
an issuer must defer making the actual decision to effect a registered public
offering until after completion of a section 4(2) private offering, was
"interpreted" out of that rule. The staff stated it would not integrate the
offerings "notwithstanding Verticom's contemplation of a registered public
offering at the time of the placement.' '15 In Vulture Petroleum Corp.,
59
the staff extended this principle to rule 506 of regulation D., stating that,
on the facts presented, "the proposed offering of securities under Rule 506
of Regulation D ... need not be integrated with the later public offering
in reliance on Rule 152.'1
6
B. Judicial Decisions
The courts that have addressed integration doctrine issues have not
contributed substantially to the development of a reliable analytical scheme
for the doctrine. 61 (The cases that present integration issues generally are
either suits brought by private parties for rescission of sales of securities
sold pursuant to an exemption, 162 or suits for injunctive relief brought by
the SEC.) 63 Prior to 1976, the courts consistently refused to integrate
157. See Real Estate Syndicates Ask Staff to Consider Reg. D Changes, 18 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 590, 591 (April 25, 1986) (stating informally that Verticom does not overrule
LaserFax and remarking that individual decisions were consistent with facts of cases.)
158. See Verticom, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 31, 1986); see also supra note 157, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 591 (quoting Mary Beach for idea that enforcing literal language
of rule 152 rewards poor planning and encourages issuers to make misrepresentations about
issuers' intentions).
159. Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407, at 77,319 (Dec. 31, 1986).
160. Id.
161. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 50. Stevenson stated that, "[t]here is relatively little
judicial authority helpful in elucidating the integration doctrine." Id; see also ABA Partnership
Report, supra note 36, at 1597. According to the ABA Partnership Report, "very few cases
have provided an analysis that is instructive to counsel involved in securities offerings that
present such issues." Id. But see Deaktor, supra note 10, at 505-13. Professor Deaktor opines
that although "the releases have proved of little aid to the courts in their analyses of the
integration problem ... an examination of the cases treating integration is potentially instructive
for the issuer." Id. at 505-06.
162. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (codifying basis for recissionary relief). A number of individuals
have filed suit seeking recissionary relief. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d
893 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Bayoud
v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
163. 15 U.S.C. §77t(b); see, e.g., SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
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securities offerings.'6 At times, the courts gave no weight to SEC releases,
other court cases, or any other authority. 65 But some courts have, in fact,
relied or purported to rely upon the five-factor test of Release No. 4552.166
To the extent that courts have relied on Release No. 4552, the "single plan
of financing" factor clearly has been the most important one in determining
whether to integrate separate offerings.'
67
One of the most celebrated and controversial cases concerning integra-
tion is SEC v. Murphy, 61 decided in 1980. In Murphy, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit integrated offerings of limited partnership interests in
approximately thirty limited partnerships and held that the real "issuer" of
those interests was a separate legal entity (Intertie), a corporation for whose
financial benefit the limited partnerships had been organized.169 The limited
partnerships were set up as part of an elaborate sale-leaseback financing
scheme, in which Intertie, through Murphy, its principal officer and chair-
man, purchased cable television systems for cash and notes and sold those
systems to the limited partnerships for cash and nonrecourse notes. Con-
currently, Intertie leased back the systems for its own cable operations.
70
Although neither Murphy nor Intertie served as general partners in the
limited partnerships, Murphy was the "architect of this financing scheme,
by which Intertie took in approximately $7.5 million from 400 investors.'
' 7'
The offerings were not registered, as the offerings purportedly were exempt
under section 4(2) of the Act and rule 146.172 No effort was made, however,
to determine whether the offerees or their purchaser representatives were
"sophisticated" as is required by the registration exemption. Additionally,
the offering memoranda made material misstatements and omissions re-
garding Intertie, particularly with respect to Intertie's serious financial
problems. 173
164. See Deaktor, supra note 9, at 508; Morrissey, supra note 20, at 168.
165. See Deaktor, supra note 9, at 509. Professor Deaktor states that, "a proportion of
the integration cases make no mention of the work of the SEC in the area, nor of cases or
authorities which have drawn on that work. Rather, the courts and parties appear to have
dealt with the integration issue purely on instinct." Id.
166. See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645 (9th Cir. 1980); Livens v. William D.
Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass. 1974); SEC v. Dunfee, [1966-67 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The ABA Partnership Report discussed Murphy, Witter, Dunfee, Marcus, and several
other cases. ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1597-1605; see also ABA Report,
supra note 22, at 614-617; Morrissey, supra note 20, at 167-175.
167. See, e.g., Murphy, 626 F.2d at 645-46; SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 144 (7th
Cir. 1982); Deaktor, supra note 9, at 510; Stevenson, supra note 10, at 50.
168. 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980).
169. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1980).
170. Id. at 637.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 637-38
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The Ninth Circuit, emphasizing the need "to 'protect investors by
promoting full disclosure of information thought to be necessary to informed
investment decisions'," held that Intertie was the real issuer of all the
offerings. 74 Although the Murphy holding has been characterized as "star-




the court did attempt to limit its scope:
[We note that our holding today does not mean that anyone who
has information material to an investment decision is transformed
into an issuer. We hold only that when a person organizes or
sponsors the organization of limited partnerships and is primarily
responsible for the success or failure of the venture for which the
partnership is formed, he will be considered an issuer for purposes
of determining the availability of the private offering exemption.
176
The court then proceeded to integrate the limited partnership offerings,
relying upon Release No. 4552:
All but the third factor militate in favor of finding integration. The
separation in time from one system offering to the next suggests
that the offerings were not integrated, but that factor is heavily
outweighed.by the remaining considerations. Clearly, the offerings
were all made for the same general purpose: they were part of one
financing plan which Murphy aptly described, "to give dollars to
the cable operating company that could be used at a cost they could
live with." To the extent that we can define classes of securities
that are not stocks or bonds, the securities at issue here-all limited
partnership interests-are of the same class. Finally, the consider-
ation for all partnership shares was the same, cash and notes secured
by the particular cable systems purchased.'"
As a result of the integration no exemption from registration was
available, and therefore, Intertie was in violation of the section 5 registration
requirement. 78 Murphy also was liable as a "substantial factor" in the
securities law violations.
79
The Murphy decision has broadened the range of offering scenarios in
which integration may occur. 80 The decision also has been credited with
174. Id. at 642-43
175. See ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1603; see also Morrissey, supra note
20, at 175. Professor Morrissey supports the Murphy holding. Id. Additionally, Professor
Morrissey commented on the ABA Partnership Report proposals, in response to cases like
Murphy. Id. According to Professor Morrissey, "the ABA's proposal ... would undermine
this tie between appropriate disclosure and the identity of an issuer and would deprive investors
of protection against such fraudulent schemes as those in Murphy and Holschuh." Id.
176. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 644.
177. Id. at 646.
178. Id. at 641.
179. Id. at 648-52.
180. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 596.
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formally placing the focus of integration inquiries on (1) the existence of
investor protection through full and fair disclosure; and (2) the economic
realities behind the formal financial and legal structures of the offerings
involved.1 81 Several courts have adopted the Murphy approach.18 2
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE; AN ANALYSIS
In view of the considerable uncertainty and inconsistency of interpre-
tation in cases involving the integration doctrine, the American Bar Asso-
ciation Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities impaneled a task
force "to examine the entire integration area and to make proposals that
would help the Commission and the securities bar to answer [troublesome]
questions."'' 8 The result of the task force's work is the extensive ABA
Report, which describes the doctrine and its development, and culminates
in specific proposals to improve the application of the doctrine.
The ABA task force report intentionally avoids an overall revision of
the doctrine; nor does the report attempt to clarify the doctrine's theoretical
underpinnings.84 Instead, the report takes a much more narrow approach,
merely proposing "additional and specific safe harbor tests that would
provide guidance in a large number of circumstances under which integration
questions might arise."'18 5 In particular, the task force report proposes the
following:
These quidelines are divided into six major categories: issuer dis-
tinctions, temporal separations, differences in securities offered,
purpose differences, policy considerations, and domestic and foreign
offering distinctions. By qualifying for any single safe harbor, the
offerings in question would be deemed separate and distinct for the
purpose of determining whether the exemptions from registration
relied upon by the issuer are available. The task force further
suggests that these safe harbors be embodied in the new rule 152
appended to this report.
86
In general, the task force report represents a substantial contribution
to the overall utility of the integration doctrine. If adopted, the ABA
proposals will be of invaluable assistance to both regulators and issuers,
and will promote capital formation within the context of 1933 Act investor
protection. Nonetheless, the proposals are in several instances unresponsive
to the needs of small businesses. Additonally, in its safe harbor proposals,
181. See Morrissey, supra note 20, at 174.
182. See SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d at 137; Western Federal Corp. v. Erickson, 739
F.2d 1439 1442-43 (1984); Stoppelman v. Owens, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,511 at 98,580 (D.D.C. 1984); see also Morrissey, supra note 20 at 174-75.
183. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 596.
184. Id. at 596-98.
185. Id. at 597.
186. Id. at 624.
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the report does not go far enough, failing to include several important areas
that are quite susceptible of safe harbor treatment with no attendant
infringement on investor protection. The result is that even under the ABA's
proposed scheme, certain unnecessary obstacles to capital formation still
exist that can and should be addressed in a more extensive safe harbor
regime.
A. The Issuer Safe Harbor
The first proposal in the ABA Report is for an "issuer" safe harbor.
The focus of this safe harbor would be those scenarios in which "offerings
potentially subject to integration are made by two legally distinct entities.'
'8 7
This proposal addresses the "issuer integration" problem, which often
involves syndications of real estate or mineral rights business entities by a
common promoter or sponsor.' The question posed under the integration
doctrine is whether the relationship of the entities to one another and to
the promoter is such that their otherwise exempt securities offerings should
be integrated. 89 Generally, this inquiry translates into the question who is
the real, or de facto, "issuer" of the securities of the related legal entities. 90
The ABA's issuer safe harbor proposal purports to answer this question.
This ABA proposal consists of a three-condition test adopted directly
from a 1982 ABA study, which was devoted to integration of partnership
offerings and was conducted by the ABA Subcommittee on Partnerships,
Trusts, and Unincorporated Associations of the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities.1 9' The proposal provides that if all three conditions
are met, offerings will not be integrated, notwithstanding any other inte-
gration rules. According to the proposal, "[n]o presumption shall arise as
to whether offerings that do not meet all of the. . . conditions are integrable
with other offerings, and the administrative and judicial interpretations on
integration in effect at the time thereof shall apply." 1 92 The proposal sets
forth the following three conditions, which, if satisfied, would demonstrate
that the offerings in question are separate and distinct: (1) separate entities:
the issuers must keep separate books and records and capital and other
funds of the issuers must not be commingled; (2) economic independence:
each issuer should have "an independent opportunity to meet its primary
investment objectives"; and (3) application of proceeds: no issuer may use
187. Id.
188. Id. at 621-22
189. Id. at 624.
190. Id.; see also SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644 (9th cir. 1980). In Murphy the court
stated that "[w]hen a person organizes or sponsors the organization of limited partnerships
and is primarily responsible for the success or failure of the venture for which the partnership
is formed, he will be considered an issuer for purposes of determining the availability of the
private offering exemption." Id. at 644.
191. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 631; ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36.
192. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 631; ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36,
at 1610-11.
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material portions of capital raised to invest in properties or projects in
which an affiliated issuer, or one with a common sponsor, has invested or
will invest a material portion of the capital it has raised. 193
The issuer safe harbor proposal appears to be, in part, a reaction to
the holding in SEC v. Murphy. 94 Both the ABA Report and the ABA
Partnership Report criticize the Murphy decision not only for being over-
broad in its language but also for placing improper emphasis on the role
of disclosure; the Murphy court integrated the offerings involved. 95 The
ABA Report does acknowledge, however, that even if there had been full
disclosure regarding the rather shady business arrangements in Murphy "it
seems clear that the Ninth Circuit would have imposed liability for violation
of Section 5 since it found that Intertie was the 'issuer' for both registration
and disclosure purposes." 96 Moreover, the report guardedly admits that the
Murphy court's focus on the economic interdependence of the common
sponsor and the issuing entities was not totally misplaced:' 97
To be sure, economic interdependence is a useful test because
separate entities, financially independent of one another a priori,
should not be regarded as part of a single business enterprise. It is
not true, however, that financially interdependent entities (such as
franchisees) should automatically be regarded as parts of a single
issuer. Thus, Murphy can be properly viewed as a litmus test to
ascertain which entities are not part of a single issuer. To use it as
a test for finding integration, however, is to create a presumption
in favor of integration. 98
Following this reasoning, the ABA proposal established the test discussed
herein for identifying discrete offerings. The test defines discrete offerings
193. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 631-32; ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36,
at 1610-11. If half or more of the assets to be purchased with the offering proceeds are not
disclosed to offerees, the third condition of the proposed issuer safe harbor prohibits the
offering of securities until other partnerships with a common sponsor have "invested, or
committed for investment, the major portion of its gross offering proceeds" for the same
general types of activities, unless the assets in which the other partnership "intends to invest
at least fifty percent of its gross offering proceeds are specifically identified to its offerees."
194. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 630; SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1980).
195. Id. The ABA Report stated that "[t]he question of whether information should be
disclosed regarding an entity is conceptually different from whether a single issuer has divided
itself into two or more nominally separate entities to avoid the registration requirement." See
also ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1603. The Partnership Report was even more
critical of the Murphy opinion, calling the opinion "startling ... to many practitioners,"
"extraordinary," and "result oriented." Id.
196. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 630.
197. Id. The ABA Report stated that "[a]lthough Murphy and its progeny have been
properly criticized for their disclosure-oriented analysis, in light of the staff's earlier no-action
letters, the focus on the economic interdependence of the promoter and the issuing entities
should not have been unexpected." Id.
198. Id.
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as those "designed to fund a separate and independent entity that is not
financially dependent upon any entity created through any other offering
involving a common sponsor."' 199 Under the ABA proposal, offerings not
satisfying the test would not necessarily be integrated; as stated earlier, they
would be analyzed according to the other existing administrative and judicial
interpretations.
2oo
Professor Morrissey has vigorously attacked the ABA issuer safe harbor
proposal. Professor Morrissey proposes instead that Murphy be given the
broadest possible interpretation, and that full disclosure regarding common
sponsors be required. According to Professor Morrissey, the full disclosure
requirement would result in larger numbers of registered offerings and
greater investor protection:
The American Bar Association's "discrete offering" proposal is
merely an elegant attempt to circumvent the registration process by
artificially expanding its carefully restricted exemptions. The various
financial dealings of issuers are separable, but not on the basis of
contrived divisions. Even though closely timed offerings may be
"financially independent" in that they have claims to different
assets, they are, in reality, part of a continual attempt to fund one
business operation. In such situations, the crucial insight of Murphy
is extremely pertinent; i.e. investors need information about the
central enterprise. If a combination of offerings would place the
total issuance outside the well considered exemptions to registration,
an SEC filing is in order.
20 1
Professor Morrissey makes forceful arguments concerning the need to
consider economic realities in determining the true issuer in an offering, as
well as the importance of disclosing to investors material information about
the true issuer. Further, although the ABA Report insists "[lt is clear...
that the question of whether information should be disclosed regarding an
entity is conceptually different from whether a single issuer has [artificially]
divided itself ... to avoid ... registration, ' 202 the investor-protection
mandate of the 1933 Act suggests otherwise. Indeed, the integration doctrine
is grounded in the need for full and fair disclosure to achieve investor
protection.
20 3
The ABA issuer safe harbor proposal, nevertheless, probably strikes the
best practical balance between the availability of non burdensome capital
199. ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1610.
200. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 631.
201. Morrissey, supra note 20, at 182-83.
202. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 630.
203. See Little & Robbins, Structuring Limited Partnership Offerings-Recent Develop-
ments, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 829, 835 (1986). According to Little and Robbins "[t]he
rationale for integration must at bottom be a concern that the disclosure obligations not be
circumvented by separating a unitary offering into its component parts. Without disclosure
concerns there would appear little need for invoking the doctrine." Id.
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formation devices and the protection of investors. Fraudulent schemes such
as the one in Murphy would not be protected by the proposed safe harbor,
primarily because the essence of such schemes is the economic interdepend-
ence of the business entities involved and the use of the separate offerings
to siphon funds from the limited partnerships into a common sponsor
through the application of proceeds.2 4 Thus if the ABA proposal were
adopted, a Murphy-type fact pattern clearly would fall outside safe harbor
protection, and the matter therefore would be relegated to a decision based
on "the administrative and judicial interpretations. . .in effect at the time."
2 °s
Prior decisions of the courts and the SEC staff indicate that the aforemen-
tioned scheme would be interpreted against the issuing and affiliated entities
in a manner that clearly furthers the interest of investor protection. Indeed,
because the three conditions at the core of the ABA proposal reflect the
staff's no-action letter responses, as well as judicial decisions such as
Murphy, it could be said that this safe harbor represents both a distillation
of salient policy and practical features of the general issuer integration
analysis and a formula for obviating the necessity of analyzing the easier
cases.
206
Appropriately, the ABA proposal also would allow certain entities to
escape integration even though they are affiliated with other businesses.
That is, in some circumstances, where the spirit and the letter of proposal
are substantially met, the separate nature of the financial structures and
offerings of businesses should be respected notwithstanding some degree of
common sponsorship or promotion. The policy and practical questions
presented in these cases are not altogether unlike those presented in actions
to "pierce the corporate veil:"
At the outset, it is recognized that a corporation is an entity,
separate and distinct from its officers and stockholders, and that
its debts are not the individual indebtedness of its stockholders.
This is expressed in the presumption that the corporation and its
stockholders are separate and distinct .... But this concept of
separate entity is merely a legal theory, "introduced for purposes
204. The subjects of the second and third conditions of the proposal are the key features
of most schemes: economic interdependence based on some contractual, corporate or limited
partnership arrangement, and the application of proceeds generated by various businesses to
further directly a larger business aim.
205. ABA Report, supra note 18, at 631-32; see SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 638 (9th
Cir. 1980). The Murphy Court stated that funds were commingled from the various partner-
ships, significant economic interdependence existed between the common sponsor and the
partnerships, and proceeds from the partnerships were applied to the needs of the common
sponsor. Id.
206. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 627-28. The ABA Report discussed the factors
that appeared relevant to the SEC staff's no-action decisions, even though the Report also
acknowledged that the SEC's letters were often inconsistent and complex. Id. Additionally the
ABA Report noted that "Murphy and its progeny ... focus on the economic interdependence
of the promoter." Id. at 630.
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of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice," and the courts
"decline to recognize [it] whenever recognition of the corporate
form would extend the principle of incorporation 'beyond its legit-
imate purposes and [would] produce injustices or inequitable con-
sequences'." 207
Thus, the issuer safe harbor proposed by the ABA would preserve the
entity and issuer status for essentially separate and distinct businesses of
common sponsors, and this would be in furtherance of both capital for-
mation and the public interest. It is appropriate to note here that even the
Murphy court stated its "holding ... does not mean that anyone who has
information material to an investment decision is transformed into an
issuer. '208 Accordingly, while full and fair disclosure principles might, even
require that information regarding common sponsors of business be pro-
vided, to the extent such information bears upon the risks and fortunes of
that business, where it is fully independent and self-sustaining, there should
not be issuer integration simply based on the mere existence of a common
sponsor. Investors would be sufficiently protected by such disclosure as is
required by the particular exemption relied upon, and the extraordinary step
of integration would not add any meaningful protection. 2°9
B. The Temporal Safe Harbor
In addition to its issuer safe harbor proposal, the ABA Report rec-
ommends a so-called "temporal safe harbor," which essentially provides
that otherwise exempt offerings, when separated by a six-month period, are
not integrable.210 The ABA temporal safe harbor proposal would extend the
present six-month safe harbors of rule 147 and rule 502(a) of regulation D
to all offerings. 21' In addition, the proposed extension would clarify the
temporal boundaries of the six-month period. According to the ABA pro-
posal, the six-month period "should be measured from the closing of the
final sale in the initial offering to the first offer of the succeeding offer-
ing. ' 212 The ABA proposal is a definite improvement over the existing
situation. Certainly, exempt offerings other than those under rule 147 and
regulation D are equally susceptible to the reasoning that the passage of
time creates a presumption of separateness and distinctness in offerings.
213
207. DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir.
1987); see also American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
412, 414-45 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (holding that without some degree of control and supervision
Court would not pierce veil of corporate subsidiary to reach parent).
208. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 644.
209. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 632, 642 app.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 633.
213. Deaktor, supra note 9, at 516. Professor Deaktor stated that "the likelihood that
integration [is] appropriate decreases as the time between offerings increases." Id.
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But the safe harbor proposed by the ABA is potentially and unjustifiably
useless in a variefy of critical situations, simply by virtue of the purely
arbitrary six-month time interval.
The ABA task force report admits that the choice of six months as an
appropriate time interval is "arbitrary; "214 yet the report urges that there is
"no compelling reason ... to suggest changing it at this time. '215 Thus,
no facts, data, or analyses other than the original reasoning behind the
presumption regarding the general passage of time support the specific
choice of a six-month period. While perhaps no studies exist to support the
selection of a six-month period, some facts suggest that a six-month safe
harbor is much less useful to small business issuers and others than, for
example, a three-month safe harbor would be. 2 6 Therefore, given the
arbitrary nature of the six-month interval, the correspondingly arbitrary
limitation on the utility of the safe harbor to small businesses should be a
cause for concern. Indeed, to the extent investor protection can be main-
tained, there may well be "compelling reason[s]" to change this safe harbor's
time interval.
Without cavil, small businesses are less well capitalized than larger ones;
have fewer resources for discerning and planning for their present and future
financial needs; and suffer a much greater threat to their existence in the
face of sudden or extensive economic shifts. 21 7 For these reasons, a small
business is more likely than a larger business to discover suddenly that it
must raise a significant amount of capital in order to continue its operations.
In such circumstances, requiring a six month waiting period before allowing
the business to make an offering of securities could be fatal. 2 8 Additionally,
and ironically, the clarification of the scope of this safe harbor in the ABA
proposal exacerbates the problem for small businesses since it would require
a "cooling-off" period of six full months between the last sale of a security
in one offering and even so much as an offer to sell securities in a succeeding
offering.2 9 Thus, the particularly time-sensitive nature of the financing
process, particularly for small businesses, combined with the admittedly
arbitrary choice of a six-month interval for the proposed safe harbor,
suggests there should at the very least be an inquiry into the feasibility of
214. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 633.
215. Id.
216. See Deaktor, supra note 9, at 517-19. Professor Deaktor, commenting on the six-
month integration safe harbors of rules 146 and 147, noted that the time period is "largely
arbitrary." Id. Professor Deaktor also discussed the special timing problems for small business
financing situations, and recommended a three-month time interval. Id.
217. Id. at 517. Professor Deaktor wrote that "[s]mall issuers tend to have difficulty
accurately predicting capital needs and are often financially unable to delay for any appreciable
period the additional financing ,necessary to meet unanticipated expenses." Id.
218. Id; see Note,. supra note 9, at 869 (discussing six-month safe harbors of rules 146
and 147). The author commented that "[tihis [safe harbor] may provide sufficient time for
all companies except for those needing the exemptions ... the most, i.e., the capital intensive
companies, particularly those in the areas of oil and gas and real estate development." Id.
219. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 633, 642.
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a shorter interval. A three-month interval, for instance, as suggested by
Professor Deaktor in relation to rule 146, would increase the utility of a
temporal safe harbor to small businesses-to the extent reasoned factual
analysis indicates such an interval would not pose any greater threat to
investor protection than does the six-month choice
220
Whatever the final choice, it is clear that some shorter period may well
exist that strikes a fairer and more rational balance between the policies of
investor protection and encouragement of small business capital formation. 22'
Certainly, a purely arbitrary choice such as the proposed six-month period
should not be allowed to impede both the search for such a balance and
the potential for an increase in capital formation opportunities.
C. The Securities Safe Harbor
In addition to the issuer and temporal safe harbor proposals, the ABA
task force report also proposes a safe harbor based on the class of security
issued. Offerings of securities of any one class would not be integrable with
offerings of any other class.m" At the heart of this proposal are four
"fundamentally distinct" classes of securities: (1) common stock; (2) pre-
ferred stock; (3)nonsecured debt; and (4) secured debt. 223
The justification for the securities safe harbor proposal, according to
the report, lies in the "fundamental" relevance of the "nature of the
securities offered . .. to the integration concept." Presumably, this as-
sertion is grounded in the belief that the greater the basic differences between
the various classes of securities of an issuer, the more likely it is that an
offering of securities from one class is separate and distinct, for integration
purposes, from an offering of those from another class. 22 More particularly,
220. Deaktor, supra note 9, at 517-19. According to Professor Deaktor, "[rieduction of
the six-month 'windows' might entice smaller issuers, whose securities ordinarily pose greater
risks than their well-established competitors, to use the rules .... Certainly, a ninety-day
"window" on both sides of a rule 146 offering should be more than adequate." Id. Professor
Deaktor supports his arguments with reference to the ninety-day prospectus delivery period
requirement of section 4(3) of the Act. Deaktor, supra note 9, at 517-519. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(3)
(1982). Instituting a three-month safe harbor for an exemption raises the question whether all
exemptions (statutory and regulatory) provide sufficient protections for investors to support
the time interval proposed.
221. At a minimum, public hearings on the topic could generate useful insights and
information. Empirical studies should not be dismissed immediately as an informative source,
particularly since the SEC now has an Office of the Chief Economist. See generally J.
MONAGHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CAsEs & MATERIALS (1985); J. Monahan
& L. Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law,
134 U. PA. L. Rav. 477, 477 (1986). Monaghan & Walker write that, "[although] once
heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now
one of the few points of general agreement among jurists." Id.
222. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 633-35, 642-43.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 633.
225. Id. The ABA Report emphasized the importance of the classes of securities being
different in the most basic ways. Accordingly, the task force chose only four "archetypical
forms" of securities with "traditional and easily determinable characteristics." Id.
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the report appears to premise its reasoning on a belief that the difference
in "straight" debt and equity securities, for example, represents not only a
difference in the basic features of the two types of investment instruments,
but also a difference in both the respective investors' and issuer's funda-
mental needs and purposes. 226 Therefore, offerings of two different types
of securities by the same issuer, because they have such different charac-
teristics and address such basically different needs and purposes, necessarily
are separate and distinct. 227 The ABA Report appears to use similar reasoning
to assume that the same type of dichotomy exists between common and
preferred stock in the equity category, and between secured and nonsecured
debt in the debt category. 228 The report concludes that a safe harbor
protecting such basically different securities from integration would provide
"no threat to the integrity of the registration process. ' 229
While the nature of the securities offered probably does indeed bear
significantly on the question whether several ostensibly separate offerings
should be deemed part of a single "offering," certain differences between
small and large businesses suggest that there are significant shortcomings in
both this premise and the proposed securities safe harbor based on it.
226. See R. McDERMoTT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (1986). McDermott
states that
[t]he parties' expectation is, of course, that ownership of the security acquired by
the investor will result in income (through yield in the form of interest on debt
securities and dividends on equity securities), and capital gain (through realized
appreciation upon disposition). In the case of a debt security, there is the expectation
of a return of capital through repayment of principal at maturity.
Id. The basic expectations of debt and equity security holders, however, often differ, and thus
the holders may conflict with respect to their desires regarding corporate operations. This
conflict arises primarily because of the different positions that the security holders occupy
with respect to the fundamental elements of the business bargain: "(a) risk of loss, (b) return,
(c) control, and (d) duration." Id. See W. KLEIN AND J. CoumE, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE, LEoAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, at x, xi (2d ed. 1986); B. MANNING, A CONCISE
TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL I (2d ed. 1981) (describing development of legal capital statutes
and common law as attempt to mitigate conflicts among security holders). According to
Manning:
The interest of creditors of a corporation and the interests of shareholders of a
corporation are likely to conflict whenever assets of shareholders are to be committed
to the corporation's treasury and whenever assets are to be distributed to shareholders
from the corporate treasury. The legal apparatus built by common law and statute
around the concept of "legal capital" is fundamentally aimed at striking a partial
accommodation of that conflict of interests. Id. at xxi.
Id.
227. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 633-35.
228. Id. See generally W. KLEIN & J. CoFFY, supra note 226 (discussing basic differences
between motives of issuers and purchasers of different securities and resulting way in which
securities' terms are structured); see also R. MCDERMOTT, supra note 226; R. HAMILTON,
CORPORATION FINANCE, CASES AND MATERIALS (1984); J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL
FINANCE (5th ed. 1975).
229. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 635.
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1. Limited Utility to Small Issuers
Because of the large issuer's generally greater appeal and bargaining
power in the capital markets, a large issuer would be in a better position
to use this proposed securities safe harbor than would a small issuer. In
fact, a large issuer may even be able to split up a single offering into
several artificially separate transactions under this safe harbor, and thus
circumvent the registration requirement merely by issuing a different class
of securities in each transaction. A small issuer, on the other hand, would
probably have neither the economic power nor the influence in the capital
markets to allow it to decide independently which particular class of security
to sell. 2 0
The typical venture capital financing arrangement illustrates the limited
flexibility of the small issuer with respect to choice of security. Venture
capitalists frequently make capital contributions in promising start-up bus-
inesses in exchange for a senior security, typically convertible preferred
stock or convertible debentures. 231 This choice of security provides a "hedge"
against the high risks inherent in venture capital investments by allowing
the investor to retain a preference with respect to distributions in liquidation
and bankruptcy, and possibly in mergers and acquisitions.232 Given the usual
230. Perhaps the strongest proof of the differences in the ability to choose the type of
security sold in small and large companies is the very nature of the choice-of-security discussion
when companies are large enough to make regular sales of securities to the public. In such a
case, commentators have written that the question is more likely to be what choice of security
is necessary to "maximize the value of the corporation to its present security holders ... and
to reduce the cost of capital." K. BLALKIN & W. GRANT, SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, at 89 (1985). The question is much less likely to be whether the
company can choose at all, as is true with smaller companies. Indeed, the focus of the
discussion often centers on topics such as what debt-equity mixture is most beneficial. See,
e.g., V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELsmN, CORPORATE FINANCE, at 317-415 (2d ed. 1979); Modigliani
& Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance & the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON.
Ray. 261 (1958); GRAHAm, DODD & COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS, at 539-50 (4th ed. 1962).
Even in the larger corporate context, however, an issuer's underwriters, "fi]n consultation
with the owners, the company's lawyer and accountant ... [must] determine what type of
security will be both flexible enough to enable the company to carry out its policies and be
attractive to investors." G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, GOING PUBLIC 105 (2d ed. 1976). The
problem for small businesses is to become attractive in the eyes of the investors.
231. VENTURE CAPrrAL AND PRIVATE OFFERING NEGOTIATION 253-57 (M. Halloran, L.
Benton & J. Lovejoy ed. (1983)); START-Up ComrpANIEs, supra note 15, at 7-7; see also ABA
SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW COMMITrEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 1983
ANNUAL MEETING FINANCING GROWTH-ORIENTED VENTURES: "WHERE THE MONEY Is", at 6-7
(1983). The ABA Committee on Small Business stated that
[t]oday, the "standard" venture capital investment is almost always in the form of
a senior preferred stock, with dividend and liquidation preference (and participation),
convertible into common stock on an agreed upon ratio (and with dilution protection
against sales below the per share investment price and against splits, dividends, and
other changes in capital structure), bearing registration rights, and frequently granting
investors other rights. Id.
232. See supra note 231.
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strength of venture capital firms' bargaining positions, viewed against the
typical backdrop of limited financing alternatives for small businesses, a
small issuer generally will not reject the venture capital investor's preference
regarding type of security.
233
Acceptance of such a financing preference thereby limits severely the
issuer's subsequent financing choices under the ABA proposal. Should the
issuer decide to accept the venture capital financing offer and also make
other separate offerings contemporaneously, two of the four classes of
securities available under the safe harbor would be eliminated automatically
from consideration. This is because under the ABA proposal, a convertible
security is "deemed to constitute both the convertible security itself and the
security into which it is convertible.
' 2 3 4
For example, if a small issuer makes an offering of convertible preferred
stock to a venture capital firm, under the ABA proposal the issuer could
not then use the safe harbor shortly thereafter to make another offering if
existing or prospective investors will accept only equity participation in that
subsequent offering through the purchase of common, preferred, or con-
vertible preferred stock. 233 The only remaining possibility under the proposed
safe harbor is nonconvertible debt. To the extent a small business has a
preference for debt financing, which is often not true with many start-ups,
its prerogative to issue debt securities or borrow funds in any form usually
is constricted by such factors as the absence of a long and successful "track
record" of profits; a small base of assets to back up the debt in the event
of default; and an inadequate "equity cushion" to support the debt.2
6
Again, small business' weaker economic position, as well as any minimum
233. Hoffman & Blakey, You Can Negotiate With Venture Capitalists, HARv. Bus. REv.,
16-24 (Mar.-Apr. 1987). Hoffman and Blakely acknowledge the traditional difficulties and
vulnerabilities small and start-up companies have in raising capital. Id. However, Hoffman
and Blakely argue that through the proper use of planning and negotiating, an enterpreneur
can utilize the venture capital process without giving in to all the extreme demands that venture
capitalists often make. Id. On the choice-of-security issue, however, the authors admit that,
"Chances are, however .... you won't get them to agree to this [taking common stock instead
of convertible preferred stock or convertible debentures] unless your bargaining position is
extremely strong." Id. at 16-17; see also Investors Tighten the Terms, VENTURE, May, 1988,
at 134 (stating that tight money is giving venture capitalists more leverage in setting conditions
of deal).
234. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 634-643.
235. Id.
236. Hoffman & Blakey, supra note 233, at 16-17. In the LaserFax no-action request
letter, counsel for the issuer explained that the plan to sell subordinated convertible securities
was a reluctant alternative to obtaining bank loans. Supra note 143. .he issuer was too new
and too asset-poor to obtain a loan. The issuer's plan of financing was to obtain bank loans,
but the banking institutions advised the issuer that the issuer's request for financing must be
turned down due to the issuer's lack of a "track" record, and the issuer's inability to provide
adequate collateral. Accordingly, the issuer reluctantly decided to conduct another private
placement under regulation D, which resulted in an integration of the issuer's offerings. -d.
See also START-uP Co~mANias, supra note 15, at 6-7 (stating that generation of internal
financing through profits and bank financing is not viable alternative for great majority of
venture-financed entrepreneurs).
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limits their founders legitimately might seek to place on sales of control,
or of preferences, to "outsiders, ' '237 portends a limited practical utility of
the proposed securities safe harbor to small businesses. 238
2. Exclusion of Negative Net Worth and Development Stage Issuers;
Additional Limits on Utility
The ABA proposal contains another limitation that would affect small
businesses adversely. The proposed securities safe harbor would protect sales
of different classes of securities only where "immediately prior to the second
offering the issuer does not have a negative net worth and is not a
develbpment stage company." 239 The task force report observes, quite cor-
237. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. (demonstrating that if business owners
are not astute, owners can be "negotiated" out of many beneficial aspects of ownership, such
as control, return, and like, during capital formation process).
238. The proposed securities safe harbor may be unavailable at times even to larger issuers
because of the potential conflict between the proposal's strict requirement that each class of
security be based on "broad, simple definitions," and the trend toward creative combinations
of the features of securities. See ABA Report, supra note 22, at 633-35; R. HAMILTON,
CoRPoRATIoNs, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMnTED PARTNERSHIPS, CASES AND MATERIALS
257 (3rd ed. 1986). Hamilton writes that
it should be clear that the precise line between "preferred" and "common" shares,
at the margin at least, was always a shadowy one. There might be little or no
difference, for example, between a "participating preferred" and a "class A com-
mon" except the title. Developments during the 1970s and early 1980s also tended
to blur this distinction (as well as the distinction between "debt securities" and
preferred shares). This was a period of extremely high interest rates and the
development of novel financing devices .... Faced with these developments, the
draftsmen of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, in section 6.01, made a
significant philosophical break with the past by studiously avoiding the words
"preferred shares" and "common shares" and by establishing a scheme of consum-
mate generality that is designed to accommodate the most innovative and ingenious
creator of new classes or types of shares.
Id.
According to the ABA Report, the securities safe harbor necessarily must contemplate
"those classes of securities so fundamentally distinct from one another [in order] that there
will be no threat to the integrity of the registration process." ABA Report, supra note 22, at
635. The result, however, may be that issuers with substantial enough economic positions to
consider using the securities safe harbor would be thwarted if the issuer's capital structures
are as creative as they often have to be in an increasingly complex economic environment. In
that event, if no other safe harbor is available, the issuer "will have to rely on Release No.
4552." ABA Report, supra note 22, at 635.
239. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 642. The exclusionary language in the proposed
securities safe harbor appears to require that before a second offering, "the issuer does not
have a negative net worth and is not a development stage company." Id. (emphasis added)
The report's description of the proposal, however, seems to describe the two situations
disjunctively, thereby making each a basis for exclusion from safe harbor protection. The
report states that, "[it seems appropriate to limit the use of the securities safe harbor to
companies other than development-stage companies, companies having a negative net worth,
and companies with financial statements qualified on a going-concern basis." Id. at 633.
It is not clear whether the third category mentioned in the ABA Report, "financial
statements qualified on a going-concern basis," is a separate test that simply was not included
in the actual proposal, or whether the third category is considered to be part of the "negative
net worth" category. This Article assumes the latter.
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rectly, that in businesses that are developing or that are seriously troubled
financially, the different classes of securities may be facially quite different
in their characteristics, but are all functionally the same. The varying
characteristics of the different classes of securities simply are not viable in
the absence of a financially sound and operational business.240 Nonetheless,
it does not follow that a securities safe harbor should exclude developing
issuers or issuers in financial trouble.
As a practical matter, the negative net worth and development stage
limitation would exclude small business issuers from protection from inte-
gration in two very critical stages of their existence, i.e., during their
development stage and during periods of extreme financial difficulty. As
such, the net worth limitation is counterproductive and should be eliminated.
Since the aim of the integration doctrine is investor protection in accordance
with the 1933 Act, the proposed securities safe harbor should be available
to developing and financially troubled businesses when the terms of the
securities are expressed clearly and when the businesses use exemptions that
contemplate extensive disclosure or comparable investor protection guaran-
tees to offerees. 241 Offerings under rules 505 and 506 of regulation D,
regulation A, sections 4(2) and 4(6) of the Act, as well as registered offerings
all appear to ensure that prospective purchasers can make informed invest-
ment decisions when these issuers distribute securities. 24 2 The ABA's pro-
posed exclusion for negative net worth and developing issuers seeks to inject
"merit regulation ' 241 reasoning into a full-disclosure regime for investor
protection under the 1933 Act. Clearly, the 1933 Act neither requires nor
contemplates such a standard.
244
240. Id. at 633.
241. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "the purpose of
Securities Acts [sic] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions").
242. See supra notes 38-51, 77-81, 90-102. Offerings under these provisions promote high
levels of investor protection by requiring extensive disclosure, financial "sophistication" of
investors, "accredited" investors, or various combinations of these elements.
243. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibili-
ties, 46 MD. L. Rav. 1027, 1039 (1987). Sargent states that
[iln essence, merit regulation is a paternalistic system of securities regulation per-
mitting the administrator to deny effectiveness to a registration statement if the
terms of the offering, the structure of the issuer, or any associated transactions do
not (i) ensure a fair relationship between promoters and public investors, and (ii)
provide public investors with a reasonable relation between risk and return.
Id.
This definition stems from the definition of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation
of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities
Offerings, 41 Bus. LAw. 785 (1986). Professor Sargent was the principal author of that report.
See Sargent, supra, at 1039 n.61.
244. Sargent, supra note 243, at 1039. According to Sargent,
The establishment of a disclosure-based federal securities regulatory system in 1933
was tantamount to a rejection of the merit-based system. Merit regulation in 1933,
as well as merit regulation in 1987, contemplated a far greater degree of intervention
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It should be noted that the economic status of the businesses excluded
under the proposed ABA safe harbor does not always render them auto-
matically unattractive or harmful to potential investors. Indeed, some inves-
tors are attracted particularly to high-risk, (potentially) high-return investments
in new and "turnaround" businesses.2 5 Whether these investors are moti-
vated by the belief that substantial changes in management will bring about
a business recovery, that market demand for the business' product is or
will be strong, or by some other belief, such investors are potent and crucial
forces in the capital formation process and in the capital markets generally.?
6
Hence, when substantial investor protection guarantees under the 1933 Act
are present, even an issuer in the development stage or with a negative net
worth should not be foreclosed from taking advantage of the proposed safe
harbor to raise capital from willing, informed investors.
Ironically, the proposed safe harbor may have its greatest utility among
small issuers in the categories excluded by the proposal. Consider, for
example, a financially troubled or development stage company whose com-
mon stock is purchased in an acquisition. Assume that the new owners have
the financial facility and business acumen to recapitalize the company on
favorable terms through a sale of preferred stock or debt. 47 This scenario
is certainly feasible in the real world, and a securities safe harbor with the
investor protection approach suggested herein could be a very useful capital
formation device. To the extent the new owners are able to persuade other
investors to provide capital in exchange for preferred stock or debt, the
owners could accomplish the task of financing the company at a level
necessary to support successful operation, while retaining basic control and
ownership of the company. Investors in the company would have the same
protections any investors have and deserve under the federal securities laws:
into private economic decisionmaking than did the form of disclosure regulation
adopted in the 1933 Act." Id.
According to one commentator, "[i]t must not be thought, however, that Disclosure and
Merit are two gods that sit on separate but equal thrones." L. Loss, supra note 1, at 36.
According to another commentator, "[Mlerit and disclosure, to some extent, occupy relative
positions on a single regulatory continuum." Sargent, supra note 243, at 1046.
245. See, e.g., The Turnaround King Investors Love, FoRTuNE, Jan. 5, 1987, at 66
(discussing dealmaker Michael Dingman). Dingman was an extraordinary dealmaker who raised
"S1.2 billion ... in the largest U. S. initial public offering ever"). Id. The money that
Dingman raised went to the Henley Group, "a money-losing bunch of businesses that Allied-
Signal didn't want and spun off to its shareholders." Id. Dingman's business philosophy was:
"[b]uy companies at a discount in depressed markets, spruce them up, wait for the market to
bounce back, then sell or spin them off at a handsome profit." Id.; see also, VEN=TR,
February, 1987, at 65, 69 (explaining that investment banking firm established "Vulture" fund
to buy oil and gas properties from companies ravaged by the free-fall in oil prices).
246. See supra note 245.
247. See supra note 245. Of course, the influence of the new owners is the key factor
that arouses the level of investor interest, making such an offering possible. According to
Professor Morrissey, "The investors' ultimate decisions are to place their funds with a given
individual running an on-going business [as opposed to a particular legal entity] .... The
promoter's entrepreneurial skills are what attract investors." Morrissey, supra note 20, at 151.
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an opportunity to invest in a venture with the expectation of a profit and
subject to the risks of loss that they have learned of and deemed acceptable
based on "full and fair disclosure" of all material information.2 s
Yet another scenario in which the ABA proposal's net worth limitations
would be ill advised is when an issuer with a negative net worth has assets
with fair market values significantly higher than their historical cost. Since
generally accepted accounting principles require that net worth be calculated
using the "actual" or "historical" cost of business assets less certain
reductions in those assets, any appreciation in the assets' value will not be
taken into account. 249 But this failure to consider the current value of assets
could render any financial analysis of a business totally distorted and
unrealistic. 2 0 The undervalued asset could be a parcel of real property,
whose value has risen because of favorable events occurring or about to
occur in close geographical proximity. Similarly, the asset could be a patent
on an important product that has just been proved effective in scientific
experiments and approved by government regulators as safe and effective
for marketing and sale to the public.25' A negative net worth issuer that is
the beneficiary of such asset appreciation actually may be in a sound and
advantageous position to engage in business enterprise and yet may be
hampered by what are essentially accounting technicalities. 252 To deny a
N
248. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1980).
249. See FnLis, KRIPKE & FOSTER, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS, TEACHING MA-
TERIALS 79 (3rd ed. 1984):
With few exceptions, financial statements are presented on the basis of "historical
cost." This means that asset values are presented at their original cost less certain
reductions, including assumed depreciation and depletion and certain diminutions in
value, but without any recognition of increases in value, some of which have become
normal in our economy. The two primary causes of increases in value are inflation
and economic changes.
Id.
250. See generally, KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CopoRATF DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH
OF A PURPOSE 160-68, 185-90 (1979). Although Professor Kripke discusses the disadvantages
of historical cost accounting in the context of public companies, Professor Kripke's arguments
still carry force in the private company context.
251. See FnLis, KIRIKE & FOSTER, supra note 249, at 80:
Economic changes are changes in the value or utility of an asset not solely related
to inflation. These changes may be due to any other factors, for example, discovery
of natural resources, zoning changes, changes in local conditions (e.g., a new facility
in the community), temporary shortages of supply (e.g., the oil shortage of the
1970's), profitability of investees, reduction in interest rates, changing demand for
housing or office space.
252. See id; Manning, supra note 226, at 71-72. In Remote Computing Corporation, SEC
No-Action Letter (Dec. 28, 1972), an issuer sought to issue common stock to certain debt
holders after completion of a regulation A offering of common stock. The issuer's financial
strategy was to reduce the issuer's extremely high level of debt and negative stockholders'
equity because this had been a serious impediment in the issuer's relations with banks, suppliers,
and larger customers. Id. Significantly, the issuer already was operating at a profit, and wanted
to change its balance sheet because it gave the misleading appearance that the issuer was
experiencing going-concern problems. Although the issuer's problems in Remote Computing
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negative net worth issuer the use of financing devices such as the proposed
securities safe harbor is unnecessary and inefficient, and limits the vitality
of the issuer, the capital markets, and the economy. Permitting the negative
net worth issuer to use the safe harbor in this instance, with the modification
suggested herein, would pose no threat whatsoever to investor protection.
A prospective investor, therefore, could make an informed choice as to
whether and to what extent to invest, based on access to information about
the real, as well as the technical, financial status of the issuer, and no
injustice would occur as a result
53
D. The Purpose Safe Harbor
The fourth safe harbor proposed by the ABA focuses on certain basic
purposes for issuing securities. Like many of the other proposals, this
proposal extracts a single criterion from Release No. 4552, and because of
the criterion's "fundamental" relevance, makes it alone the basis of a safe
harbor.2
4
Admitting that the purpose criterion is highly subjective, the ABA task
force proposes to make the purpose criterion more objective by recognizing
only the following "four fairly well defined purposes for securities offer-
ings:"2
5
(i) to raise capital;
(ii) to extinguish indebtedness through an exchange of securities;
(iii) to secure human resources; and
(iv) to acquire business operations or assets.
256
Under the ABA proposal, any one of these four purposes could be the
basis of a separate and distinct offering. Further, when several purposes
exist for an offering, any purpose requiring more than twenty-five percent
of the proceeds of the offering would be deemed the "purpose" of the
offering.
5 7
The purpose safe harbor would make offerings for certain typical and
clearly different purposes nonintegrable with each other, and therefore,
would be quite useful to issuers. Nevertheless, certain other purposes also
could have been included in this proposal that would not compromise the
Corporation did not result from an historical cost valuation problem, the case illustrates the
dilemma of a company limited by accounting technicalities even though its business prospects
are strong. It is also noteworthy that the issuer used a securities offering to eliminate the
issuer's financial "image" problem.
253. See Sargent, supra note 243, at 1039. Sargent wrote that "theoretically, therefore,
the SEC will not, indeed cannot, deny registration to an offering that appears to be egregiously
unfair to the public investor, or presents an extraordinary amount of risk, so long as all
information material to the offering has been disclosed." Id.
254. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 635.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 635-36.
257. Id.
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protections for investors under the Act, and would provide great practical
benefits to issuers. Given their typically more precarious economic circum-
stances, small business issuers would benefit immeasurably from the adop-
tion of the recommendations below.
1. Offerings Necessitated by "Unforeseen Operating Difficulties"
When the purpose of an offering is to provide funds necessitated by
"unforeseen operating difficulties," such as the substantial loss, unavaila-
bility, or destruction of assets caused by criminal acts, acts of God, severe
economic downturns, technological developments, or similar phenomena,
the offering should receive the protection of a purpose safe harbor. This
formulation is based on cases such as Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., 58
in which a prior offering was not integrated with a subsequent offering
when the purpose of the second offering was to raise funds to sustain a
new tungsten ore mining company until unforeseen operating difficulties
could be resolved.25 9 The court in Barrett relied directly on Livens v. William
D. Witter, Inc.260 in deciding not to integrate the offering. In Livens "each
successive financing was expected to be the last which would be required
to make . . . [the issuer] self-supporting," but "[a] series of obstacles to
profitability was encountered, many of them beyond the control of the
company or the defendants. ' 26' It should be noted that the "unforeseen
operating difficulties" contemplated by the proposed addition to the purpose
safe harbor would begin with the types of problems present in Barrett and
Livens and continue along a spectrum of increasingly compelling phenomena
justifying the offering.
The courts in Barrett and Livens relied primarily on the conclusion that
offerings based on unforeseen operating difficulties are not part of a single
plan of financing. 262 But those types of offerings also can be said to be for
distinctly different purposes, thus making them appropriate for a "purpose"
safe harbor. Indeed, it has been said that "plan of financing" and "pur-
pose" are overlapping, if not synonymous, factors. 263 For example, and to
258. Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,438 (1976).
259. Id. at 99,212.
260. 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974).
261. Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass. 1974).
262. Livens, 374 F. Supp. at 1107; Barrett, supra note 258, at 99,212.
263. Livens, 374 F. Supp. at 1107. The court in Livens stated that the offerings were for
the same general purpose. Id. However, the court's characterization merely reflects the
confusing semantics involved in the usage of the two terms. If the term "purpose" implies
the assets, liabilities, or operations on which the raised funds will be spent, the court's
characterization of the term is correct. On the other hand, if the purpose of the offering
constituted an attempt to raise funds to compensate for an unexpected lack of profitability,
the Livens court should have distinguished between the two offerings.
See also ABA Partnership Report, supra note 36, at 1610. According to the ABA
Partnership Report, "whether or not the different offerings 'are part of a single plan of
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illustrate the proposal, if a fire or a flood destroys a company's inventory,
an offering to raise capital to replace the destroyed inventory definitely
could not be considered part of any previous company plan of financing.
Further, even if the company had made prior offerings to raise capital for
general operating purposes, including the purchase of inventory, the emer-
gency-based offering is clearly different in purpose because of the exigent
facts providing the impetus for the offering. Therefore, the addition of an
unforeseen operating difficulty purpose to the proposed purpose safe harbor
would reflect the two most significant criteria of Release No. 4552, and the
purpose safe harbor itself would provide critical and justified assistance in
numerous real-life business situations.
As with other safe harbors, failure to comply with the unforeseen
operating difficulty proposal's requirements could render the issuer in vio-
lation of section 5 of the Act. 26 Therefore, an issuer would be obliged to
make a careful analysis of its financial situation before attempting to invoke
this safe harbor purpose. Additionally, a disclosure requirement that. the
unforeseen problem be explained fully would be a deterrent to attempts by
an issuer to "create" emergencies in order to effect nonintegrable exempt
offerings. Finally, the phrase "operating difficulties" should be interpreted
to mean a threat to continued business existence. This narrow interpretation,
when combined with a disclosure requirement and the general categories of
sources of totally unforeseen operating difficulties described herein, would
restrict the applicability of this safe harbor to demonstrably exigent circum-
stances in which potential investors are fully aware of all material matters.
The balance of utility to business issuers and protection for investors makes
the unforeseen operating difficulty purpose ideal for incorporation into the
ABA's proposed purpose safe harbor regime.
265
financing,' can be viewed as a restatement of the question of whether or not the offerings are
being made for the same general purpose." Id.; see also Stevenson, supra note 10, at 52
(stating that in many no-action letters the terms "plan of financing" and "purpose" appear
to be interchangeable); Deaktor, supra note 9, at 529 (explaining that in some inquiries, courts
appear to equate single plan of financing factor with purpose of offerings factor). In SEC v.
Murphy, the Ninth Circuit essentially equates the two factors, holding that, "IT]he offerings
were all made for the same general purpose: they were part of one financing plan ... 'to
give dollars to the cable operating company [to] be used at a cost they could live with."' SEC
v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 646 (9th Cir. 1980). (quoting Murphy's own testimony).
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982). If a safe harbor's terms are not met, the issuer must
rely on Release No. 4552. There, of course, the uncertainties abound, but one very possible
outcome is integration. See Rule 502(a) of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1987).
265. Clearly, the language of an unforeseen operating difficulties purpose would leave
room for interpretation, and therefore, some uncertainty. However, the compelling need for
a purpose tied to financially debilitating exigencies, along with the narrowly drawn elements
of the purpose, presents a considerably more reliable alternative than the purposes that presently
exist. In this regard it should be noted, however, that the SEC rejected a "change in
circumstances" concept when the SEC promulgated rule 144. See Securities Act Release No.
33-5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230 (1987) (governing time at which investors
can engage in resale of securities). While this may bode ill for the adoption of the proposal,
the practical and policy rationales expressed herein deserve, at the least, serious consideration.
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2. Offerings to Comply with "Antidilution" Agreements
The purpose safe harbor also should exempt from integration certain
offerings to negate or reduce the dilutive effects of another offering when
a written preemptive right or other antidilution agreement exists, written
notice of intent to exercise antidilution rights is provided to the issuer, and
full disclosure of the nature and purposes of both offerings is made to all
offerees.
In the early stages of a business, antidilution agreements are often
central to financing arrangements. They are almost invariably present in
venture capital financing deals. 26 To the extent that they arise in fair, arms-
length transactions, these agreements, which allow an investor to preserve
some percentage of his initially-acquired claim to earnings, net assets in the
event of liquidation, and control of the business, deserve to be enforced.
Potential for conflict exists, however, between antidilution agreements and
subsequent plans to issue securities to others. When the subsequent offerings
themselves cannot accommodate the antidilution rights, a separate offering
is necessary, and thus, an integration issue can arise and possibly thwart
the issuer's financing plans.
267
Antidilution offerings can be protected by a safe harbor without jeop-
ardizing investoT protection. This is true for several "structural" reasons.
First, in an antidilution offering the securities are sold at the insistence of
the investors entitled to purchase them, and the offering is mainly in
furtherance of the interests of the investors, not those of the issuer. Second,
the investors already have purchased the issuer's securities and want to
purchase more of precisely the same class of security; thus, the investors
can be presumed to be familiar with the terms of the security and the
issuer. 261 To the extent the issuer makes full disclosure to all offerees of
both offerings, and the antidilution agreement is pre-existing and in writing,
the separate offering poses no threat to investor protection. For these
reasons, integrating the offerings would serve no practical purpose or policy.
In Pacific Resources, Inc.,269 the SEC staff took a no-action position
with respect to integration 6f a proposed registered public offering by
existing shareholders and warrantholders of a corporation with a concurrent
issue of common stock pursuant to an antidilution agreement. It was
particularly significant in this matter that the public offering was to be
made by existing stockholders and warrantholders, while the private offering
266. See VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 231, at 260; CAPITAL FORMATION, PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC FINANCINGS 237 (PLI 1982).
267. For example, the subsequent offering could be made under the authority of rule 506
to thirty-five unaccredited investors, under circumstances in which the securities with the
antidilution provision were also sold to unaccredited investors. Alternatively, the subsequent
offering could be sold pursuant to the intrastate exemption, and the previous offerings with
antidilution provisions could have been to nonresidents.
268. See A. HOFFMAN, ISRAELS ON CORPORATE PRACTICE § 5.22, at 148-49 (4th ed. 1983).
269. Pacific Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, (Aug. 14, 1987).
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was to be made by the issuer corporation. 270 Obviously, there was no single
plan of financing, although the corporation was obligated to issue stock
upon exercise of the warrants and, of course, would receive funds based
on that issuance. Additionally the purposes of the two offerings clearly
were different. As a result, integration of the offerings was unnecessary,
because investors were protected; the corporation merely sought to comply
with the express terms of an investment contract. 27'
Although there were two different offerors in Pacific Resources, there
is also justification for not integrating an antidilution offering with a
contemporaneous offering when the corporate issuer makes both offerings.
Such was the situation in Kaiser Resources, Ltd.
272
In Kaiser Resources, the SEC staff took a no-action position when the
issuer, a Canadian subsidiary, proposed to issue restricted common shares
through a private offering to its American parent and to ten Japanese
companies. The issuer also proposed to make a concurrent registered public
offering of warrants to purchase common stock. The stated purpose of the
public offering was "[to] minimize the dilutive effect (from 25% to 10.4%)
upon public shareholders resulting from issuance of shares to [the] Japanese
Purchasers and Kaiser Steel." This clear difference in purposes was signif-
icant in the Staff's decision not to recommend enforcement action based
on the integration doctrine.
273
In summary, while there are numerous scenarios under which the
antidilution/integration issue can arise, the inherent nature of the antidilu-
tion agreement, combined with a written agreement, written notice of intent
to exercise antidilution rights, and full disclosure to all offerees, 274 presents
a compelling case for adding this purpose to the proposed purpose safe
harbor.
E. The Policy Safe Harbors
The ABA Report recommends certain policy safe harbors directed at
sections 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) of the 1933 Act, and at issuance sequences
wherein an exempt offering is made "in close proximity" to a public
offering.27 The ABA recommends policy safe harbors because the ABA
task force believes that improvements in the securities laws since enactment
of the 1933 Act have "augmented investor protection in a number of ways,"
thus rendering the registration process "less important in the overall pattern
of investor protection." Thus, the ABA task force believes that any necessity
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Kaiser Resources, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, (Aug. 1, 1973.)
273. Id.
274. Disclosure could be important, for example, to an offeree concerned about the post-
offering control structure of the issuer.
275. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 636-643.
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for a policy bias favoring registration is diminished. 276 These proposed policy
safe harbors generally would bring sound and welcome relief.
Section 3(a)(9) exempts from registration "any security exchanged by
the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no commission
or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting
such exchange. '277 Securities exchanged in Bankruptcy Act proceedings
under 11 U.S.C. § 1145 are not included in the exemption's coverage. The
policy safe harbor proposal would extend safe harbor protection to issues
made under this section only in instances in which the issuer "has been
subject to, and has satisfied, the reporting requirements of the Exchange
Act during the twelve months preceding the otherwise exempt exchange
offer." 278 Even though only existing security holders who are presumably
familiar with the issuer are involved, no new funds are being raised, and
no solicitation pressures are allowed under this section, the task force does
not believe safe harbor treatment is justified without the protection of
Exchange Act reporting requirements.
279
The proposed policy safe harbor, which the report describes as "a great
[practical] convenience for convertible securities and routine refinancing
transactions, ' 280 would be unavailable to most small businesses. The una-
vailability results directly from the requirement that the issuer be an Ex-
change Act reporting company, with all the attendant costs, potential
liabilities, and other burdens. 28' Indeed, a strict requirement that issuers be
Exchange Act reporting companies appears to conflict with the task force's
prefatory language that sufficient enhancements to investor protection have
occurred during the past fifty years such that no bias toward registration
is warranted. 2 2 Under the policy safe harbor proposal, registration-under
the 1934 Act instead of the 1933 Act-is not merely the bias, it is the prime
requirement.
From the perspective of small businesses, an infinitely better requirement
would be one-time disclosure according to rule 502(b)(2)(i) of regulation D,
as applied to nonreporting companies issuing securities under rule 505 and
506.23 First, a one-time disclosure requirement still would require that the
issuer provide extensive and specific disclosure, under one of the SEC's
more recent regulatory improvements in investor protection, using a disclo-
sure process of the type with which a small business' principals may be
276. Id. at 636.
277. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1982).
278. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 637.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 636.
281. See Scheider & Schargel, supra note 50.
282. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 596, 600, 636, 641.
283. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i). Rule 502(b) requires the disclosure of most of the
information that an offeror would have to disclose in part 1 of an applicable registration
statement form. The somewhat abbreviated financial disclosure requirements are a major
exception. See ELKINS & MEEKs, supra note 90, at A-33 through A-39.
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familiar.284 Second, the costs and other burdens incurred by a one-time
disclosure would be much lower than they would be if Exchange Act
reporting were required, particularly when a small company needs to effect
only a few transactions, one of which is a section 3(a)(9) offering.25 If the
claims of improvements in the securities laws are true, this recommended
change to the ABA proposal, coupled with the built-in protections of section
3(a)(9), would provide a much-improved balance of investor protection and
promotion of capital formation for all businesses.
Section 3(a)(10) provides an exemption from registration for certain
exchange issuances of securities when the issuance is approved by a judicial
or administrative body.286 The ABA task force observes that an opportunity
to be heard and a specific determination of the "fairness" of the transaction
constitutes "merit review," and thus, provides "even greater investor pro-
tection than the registration process. ' 287 Accordingly, the ABA task force
proposes section 3(a)(10) as a policy safe harbor. Given the proposal's
applicability to all businesses and guarantees of investor protection, it is
acceptable and could be beneficial to small businesses.
The task force also proposes to extend rule 152, which precludes
integration of a private offering under section 4(2) with a contemporaneous
public offering, to any exempt offering/public offering combination. 288 Since
"registration provides the ultimate protection to investors," an exempt
offering in close proximity to a registered offering is said to be no threat
to the public offering investors.29 There is no specific requirement, however,
that the issuer disclose the registered offering to exempt offering investors.
Additionally, the ABA report assumes that exempt offering investors are
"no worse off (and, in many cases, better off) than if the public offering
had not taken place." The theory is that the exempt offering investor could
only benefit when the issuer is free to raise capital "at the time it is
needed." 290 Finally, any exempt investors who invested without knowledge
of an issuer's planned or contemplated subsequent offering would be "suf-
ficiently protected" under the 1933 Act's antifraud provisions.29'
The ABA proposal should require affirmative disclosure by the issuer
of its known offering plans to offerees of both offerings (to the extent, of
course, that the issuer is aware of such plans). This is the fairest and most
practical arrangement for potential investors in exempt offerings. Private
and small offering investors may have concerns about dilution, registration
284. See ELKzns & MEEKS, supra note 90, at A33-A39.
285. Id.; Scheider & Schargel, supra note 50.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1982).
287. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 637. The proposal appears in the appendix to the
ABA Report at page 643. Id. at 643.
288. Id. at 638, 643.
289. Id. at 638. The ABA report noted that, "In all probability, the public offering
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rights, and the like, which could affect their investment decisions. 292 Such
investor concerns should be raised and resolved early on in the investment
transaction. In the event an issuer's overall financing plans are objectionable
to an offeree, the offeree can inquire further, negotiate other terms of
investment, or simply refuse to invest. In this way, issuers can avoid
expensive, time-consuming litigation under the antifraud provisions of the
Act. Small businesses would benefit particularly from a proposal structure
that encourages resolution of objections and disputes without litigation,
which depletes precious resources and jeopardizes newly-earned reputations.
Finally, the proposed extension of rule 152 wisely excludes the require-
ment in rule 152 that to preclude integration, an issuer effecting a public
offering after an exempt offering must have made the decision to effect the
public offering after completion of the exempt offering. 293 The theory of
the ABA task force is in accord with the SEC staff's positions in Verticom294
and Vulture Petroleum.
295
F. Foreign Offering Safe Harbor
The final safe harbor proposal made by the ABA Report would protect
offerings made outside the United States to persons not residents of the
United States as long as the issuer has taken "reasonable measures" to
prevent the securities sold from flowing back into the United States.296 The
foreign offering safe harbor proposal derives primarily from previous SEC
pronouncements protecting such foreign offerings made under section 4(2)
of the Act2 97 and under regulation D.291 In the rare instances in which the
SEC has provided significant guidance, it has adhered to the position that
the registration requirements are designed to protect only American inves-
tors.299 A key requirement of this safe harbor, also true of the SEC
pronouncements, is the efforts of the issuer to ensure that the purchased
securities actually "come to rest" abroad.3 °
The foreign offerings safe harbor proposal poses no threat to the
investors sought to be protected under the 1933 Act, and clearly is welcome
in an era of the globalization of securities markets. While the scarcity of
resources available to small businesses to make foreign offerings of securities
may well limit the safe harbor's utility to small businesses, the proposal
has merit generally and should be adopted.
292. See generally VENTURE CA'rrAL, supra note 231, at 259-64; STRT-up CoAmras,
supra note 15, § 7.06.
293. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 643.
294. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
295. Id.
296. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 643.
297. Registration of Foreign Offdrings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No.
4708, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361 (July 9, 1964).
298. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
299. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 639-40.
300. Id. at 640-41.
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V1. CONCLUSION
The integration doctrine continues to frustrate issuers engaged in the
capital formation process, engulfing them in a sea of ambiguity, uncertainty,
and potential liability. Although the doctrine was created out of a legitimate
concern that the investor-protection mandate of the Securities Act of 1933
not be thwarted, the doctrine's development has left unresolved many serious
problems. The integration doctrine has elusive formulas, with subjective,
unweighted, and overlapping terms, and the doctrine's safe harbors have
arbitrarily derived time intervals. Finally, the application of the doctrine by
the courts, the SEC, and the SEC staff has often resulted in vague and
inconsistent pronouncements.
Of the various proposals to improve the doctrine, those submitted by
the task force of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
are the most comprehensive and promising. While the task force avoided
any attempt at developing a complete "analytical mairix . . . for resolving
all integration problems," that body developed several very "safe" safe
harbors, hoping that conservatively crafted proposals would be more readily
adopted. 30' Unfortunately, the Commission has not seen fit to adopt, in
whole or in part, the ABA proposals, thus leaving the integration enigma
fully intact.
302
The modifications to the ABA proposals that this Article recommends
are offered in the interest of the many small businesses that are particularly
and inherently disadvantaged in the capital formation arena. The recom-
mendations are at times less conservative than the ABA proposals, but they
still represent a balance of the interests of investor protection and capital
formation that furthers the public interest. The SEC should give serious
consideration to the ABA proposals as modified by the recommendations
outlined in this Article. The result of such consideration could well be the
beginning of a truly useful and workable doctrine of integration of securities
-offerings.
301. ABA Report, supra note 22, at 597-98.
302. In a letter dated March 13, 1987, commenting on SEC proposed revisions to regulation
D, the ABA expressed the following opinion to the $EC regarding the SEC's failure to adopt
various ABA integration proposals:
Unfortunately, the Commission staff has not reacted to these repeated requests for
assistance. The need for pragmatic analysis of the integration issue continues.
[A]though letters such as Verticom ... are helpful, we urge the Commission to
address the integration issue as a whole and to assist practitioners towards a
practicable application of the major relevant factors.
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